Economics and Finance


Inventory Holding and International Mixed Duopoly

Authors: Kazuhiro Ohnishi

This paper considers a two-period international mixed duopoly model in which a domestic state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm and a foreign profit-maximizing private firm are allowed to hold inventories as a strategic device. In the first period, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses how much it sells in the current market and the level of inventory it holds for the second-period market. By holding inventory, a firm can change the competitive environment in the second period. The paper demonstrates that inventories are used by the domestic state-owned public firm to achieve a collusive outcome.

Comments: 19 Pages. Published in The Hellenic Open Business Administration Journal;

Download: PDF

Submission history

[v1] 2018-07-01 03:36:43

Unique-IP document downloads: 9 times is a pre-print repository rather than a journal. Articles hosted may not yet have been verified by peer-review and should be treated as preliminary. In particular, anything that appears to include financial or legal advice or proposed medical treatments should be treated with due caution. will not be responsible for any consequences of actions that result from any form of use of any documents on this website.

Add your own feedback and questions here:
You are equally welcome to be positive or negative about any paper but please be polite. If you are being critical you must mention at least one specific error, otherwise your comment will be deleted as unhelpful.

comments powered by Disqus