[1] viXra:1111.0034 [pdf] submitted on 8 Nov 2011
Authors: Stephen P. Smith
Comments: 16 pages
The process of error recognition is explored first in statistics, and then in science. The
Type II error found in statistical hypothesis testing is found analogous to Karl Popper�s �logical
probability� that is intended to measure the likelihood that a scientific theory can avoid its
refutation. Nevertheless, Popper�s reliance on deductive thinking is found detracting from his
demarcation that separates science and metaphysics. An improved critical logic for science is
presented that permits error recognition more broadly: for induction by Popper�s falsification
principle; but also for deduction and emotionality. The reality of induction creates a limitation for
a science that has not accommodated a fuller menu of error recognition. The reality of induction
places limits of what can be known from empiricism, and this has philosophical implications.
Category: General Science and Philosophy