Economics and Finance


Partial Privatization in International Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition

Authors: Kazuhiro Ohnishi

This paper examines privatization policy in a price-setting mixed duopoly where a domestic public firm competes against a foreign private firm. The domestic government chooses the degree of privatization to maximize domestic welfare. The paper considers two games: Bertrand-Nash competition and Stackelberg competition with the domestic firm being the leader. The paper shows that neither full nor partial privatization is optimal in the two international mixed duopoly games with price competition.

Comments: 21 Pages. Published in The Hellenic Open Business Administration Journal;

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Submission history

[v1] 2018-07-01 04:08:34

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