The Case for Proportional Allocation of Presidential Electors

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Abstract

The paper presents a simple and fair method to proportionally allocate presidential electors from each state, in a transparent and reproducible manner, based solely on mathematical considerations. States are free to adopt this method for allocating their electors on their own, and citizen led movements can organize to create ballot initiatives for its adoption in their states to force it. Its adoption will create a host of benefits to voters and the country, resulting in more fair and democratic electoral outcomes.

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Introduction

Currently there are 538 electors distributed among the 50 states and the District of Columbia (DC). To become President, the U.S. Constitution requires a candidate must receive the Electoral College vote of a majority of electors (270), but it doesn't specify, or mandate, the manner in which electors shall be allocated by the states to candidates. The *practice* has become to allocate electors on a *winner-take-all* basis to whichever candidate merely wins a plurality (not even a majority) of the popular vote in each state. Presented here is a simple and fair method to proportionally allocate electors from each state, in a transparent and reproducible manner, based solely on mathematical considerations. This will create a host of benefits to voters and the country, resulting in more fair and democratic electoral outcomes.

Math

The process to proportionally allocate electors presented here is mathematically clear and simple, and can easily and quickly be done by hand, by performing just a few, short, arithmetic calculations. Just four (4) parameters (values) are used in the process (algorithm) to proportionally allocate electors.

Electors Threshold (ET)

The Electors Threshold is the minimum number of votes needed by a candidate to receive at least one (1) elector, or equivalently, the minimum state popular vote percentage needed to receive one elector.

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For a state with N electors, ET (votes) = (state popular vote / N) votes.
For a state with N electors, ET (%) = (1 / N)*(100) = (100 / N) % of state popular vote.
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Example using Alabama's (9 electors) 2016 Election total popular vote of 2,123,372. ET (votes) = (2,123,372 / 9) = 235,930.22, always rounded up (take ceiling), is 235,931 votes. ET (%) = (1 / 9)*(100) = (100 / 9) = 11.11% of popular vote.

Thus for the 2016 Election in Alabama, any presidential candidate receiving at least 235,931 votes, which is 11.11% of the state popular vote, would receive at least one (1) elector.

Popular Vote % (PV%)

The percentage of the popular vote each candidate receives in each state.

Computed Electors (CE)

Computed Electors (CE) = (number of electors)*(popular vote % / 100), (a mixed fraction value)

Allocated Electors (AE)

Allocated Electors (AE) = adjusted CE value to a whole number, (the official allocated electors value)

rounding – if the fractional part of a number is greater than or equal to 0.5, then round-up: $6.58 \rightarrow 7$ if the fractional part of a number is less than 0.5, then round-down: $7.42 \rightarrow 7$

Allocation of Electors

Presented here is the step-by-step process for allocating electors within a state based on the share of the popular vote candidates receive. It explains how to allocate electors under all possible mathematical scenarios. The process is simple and transparent, and can quickly and easily be done by hand.

Step 1: Determine the number of candidates that satisfy the **Electors Threshold (ET)** in each state.

If only one candidate satisfies a state's ET that candidate receives all the state's N electors by **default** (**electors landslide**) and the allocation process ends. If N candidates satisfies a state's ET, each one gets one (1) elector, and the process ends. If more than one, but less than N, candidates satisfies a state's ET then proceed to Step 2. If no candidates satisfies a state's ET proceed to Step 5.

Step 2: Determine the **AE** values for each candidate from their **rounded CE** values.

Calculate the CE (computed electors) values for each candidate and **round** them to a whole number. This represents their minimum AE (allocated electors) values. If their sum equals the number of state electors the process is finished. If their sum is less than the number of state electors (some electors are not allocated) proceed to Step 3. If their sum is greater than the number of electors proceed to Step 4.

Step 3: Assign unallocated electors to candidates with the largest rounded-down fractional CE parts.

At this stage some (usually 1 or 2) electors have not been allocated. Candidates whose CEs have been rounded-up (e.g. $4.56 \rightarrow 5$) have maxed out their allocated electors (AE) and cannot receive more. The fractional parts of the remaining candidates CE values are then used to determine allocation. If the remaining electors equal a whole number multiple of these candidates, then each candidate receives an equal share (e.g. for 2 electors and 2 candidates, each candidate gets 1 additional elector). If the number of remaining electors is not a multiple of the candidates, then the candidates with the larger fractional parts of their CE values get an elector, until all the electors are allocated. Thus, electors are allocated to candidates whose CE values are closer to their next higher whole number than the other candidates.

Step 4: Subtract an allocated elector from candidate(s) with smallest fractional **CE** parts until correct.

If all candidates CEs were rounded up, and the total exceeds the number of electors, reduce by one the allocated electors, starting with the candidate with the smallest CE fractional part, until count is correct.

Step 5: If no candidates satisfy the ET, use Ranked Choice Voting until at least one candidate does.

This necessitates states use Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) [2] to conduct presidential elections. In the 2016 Election, Maine's voters passed Ballot Initiative Question 5 [3,4], making it the first state to adopt using RCV for state and congressional office elections (excluding President). Thus, precedent for using RCV on a statewide basis has now been set, and creates a basis for it to be adopted nationally.

Usually RCV is used to ensure the winning candidate receives a majority of the votes cast. In this case RCV will be used, for as many rounds as necessary, to increase the candidates votes until at least one satisfies the ET. When this is achieved RCV ends and the allocation process begins from Step 1.

Example Applications of Allocation Process

Presented here are examples of the allocation process using election results from the 2016 Election [1]. For the purposes herein, the District of Columbia (DC) is referred to as a state. The state-by-state presentation of the full results for the 2016 Elections, et al, are provided at the end of the paper.

Step 1: Determine the number of candidates that satisfy the Electors Threshold (ET) in each state.

From the election results for each state, use the percentage of the popular vote for each candidate and determine which candidates have at least (100 / N electors) % of the vote. For the 2016 Election, in five states (DC, N. Dakota, S. Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) an *electors landslide* occurred, where only one candidate met the ET, and thus received by default all the electors. They have the minimum 3 electors, thus their ETs are the mathematical maximum 33.33% (one-third) of the popular vote.

Clinton received 90.1% in DC and 56.7% in Vermont (Trump got 4.1 and 30.3%), while Trump got 63.0% in N. Dakota, 61.5% in S. Dakota, and 68.2% in Wyoming (Clinton: 27.2%, 31.7%, 21.9%).

If there becomes an issue with whether the popular vote % satisfies the ET, always compute the ET votes requirement, and use that as the basis for satisfying the ET, as this is always an exact number.

Thus after Step 1, 5 states electors have been allocated, and the remaining 46 states continue to Step 2.

Step 2: Determine the AE values for each candidate from their rounded CE values.

We first compute the CE, and round it to an AE, for each candidate. These AEs are added to determine if all the electors have been allocated to these candidates. If yes, the process ends; if not, go to Step 3.

Case 1: For Alabama (9 electors) only Trump and Clinton met its 11.11% ET. We proceed as follows.

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Trump: CE = (9 \text{ electors})*(62.1\% / 100) = 5.589, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 6 \text{ electors}
Clinton: CE = (9 \text{ electors})*(34.4\% / 100) = 3.094, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 3 \text{ electors}
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Because 6 + 3 = 9, all the electors have been allocated, and the process ends with these AE values.

Case 2: For New York (29 electors) only Trump and Clinton met its 3.45% ET; we do the following:

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Trump: CE = (29 \text{ electors})*(36.4\% / 100) = 10.56, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 11 electors Clinton: CE = (29 \text{ electors})*(59.0\% / 100) = 17.11, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 17 electors \rightarrow 18
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Because 11 + 17 = 28 is less than 29 we have one (1) free elector and have to proceed to Step 3.

Step 3: Assign unallocated electors to candidates with the largest rounded-down fractional **CE** parts.

Since Trump's CE value is rounded-up to an AE of 11 electors, he cannot receive anymore electors. Clinton, the only remaining candidate whose CE was rounded-down, gets the free elector, and now has an AE of 18. The 29 electors are now all allocated between Trump and Clinton, and we're finished.

Case 3: For California (55 electors) Trump, Clinton, Johnson, and Stein met its 1.81% ET, and thus:

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Trump: CE = (55 \text{ electors})^*(31.5\% / 100) = 17.35, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 17 electors \rightarrow 18 Clinton: CE = (55 \text{ electors})^*(61.5\% / 100) = 33.83, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 34 electors Johnson: CE = (55 \text{ electors})^*(3.4\% / 100) = 1.87, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 2 electors Stein: CE = (55 \text{ electors})^*(2.0\% / 100) = 1.10, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 1 elector
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The sum of these AEs is 54 electors, thus one elector hasn't been allocated, so we continue to step 3. Because Clinton's and Johnson's CEs were rounded-up their AEs are maxed, so we determine whether Trump or Stein receives the free elector. Because Trump's CE fractional part of 0.35 is greater than Stein's 0.10 CE fractional part, his AE is increased to 18, and now all the electors have been allocated.

<u>Case 4:</u> For Washington (12 electors) Trump, and Clinton satisfy the 8.33 % ET, thus we do:

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Trump: CE = (12 \text{ electors})*(36.9\% / 100) = 4.428, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 4 electors \rightarrow 5 Clinton: CE = (12 \text{ electors})*(52.6\% / 100) = 6.312, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 6 electors \rightarrow 7
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Because 4 + 6 = 10 electors are allocated there are two free electors. We still follow the rule for Step 3. Since Clinton's and Trump's CEs are rounded-down they can both receive more electors. Here there are 2 free electors and 2 candidates, so they each get one additional elector, and now all 12 are allocated.

Step 4: Subtract an allocated elector from candidate(s) with smallest fractional **CE** parts until correct.

Case 5: For Georgia (13 electors) in 1992, Clinton, Bush, and Perot satisfy the 7.69 % ET, thus we do:

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Clinton: CE = (13 \text{ electors})^*(43.5\% / 100) = 5.655, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 6 electors
Bush: CE = (13 \text{ electors})^*(42.9\% / 100) = 5.577, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 6 electors \rightarrow 5
Perot: CE = (13 \text{ electors})^*(13.3\% / 100) = 1.729, perform rounding \rightarrow AE = 2 electors
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Here all the candidates CE values were rounded-up, and their total AE exceeds 13. Since Bush's CE fractional part is the smallest, his AE value is reduced from 6 to 5, to produce the final total allocation.

Step 5: If no candidates satisfy the ET, use Ranked Choice Voting until at least one candidate does.

There have been no historical instances where this scenario occurred, but it's mathematically possible, and more likely to occur in states with the fewest electors (highest ET).

For example, in 2016 Montana (3 electors) had 8 candidates on its ballot that received votes. If none received its ET of 33.33% of the voters, an RCV round is performed, dropping the candidate with the lowest vote total, and adding that candidate's voters second choices to the remaining candidates. If at least one candidate now satisfies the ET vote requirement, resume from Step 1. If not, another RCV round is conducted, etc, until at least one candidate satisfies the ET, and then Step 1 is performed.

If a tie occurs (in votes received) between candidates who are subject to gain (lose) an elector at any Step, the one with the higher popular vote in more counties gains (not loses) the elector. If a tie still exists after this, then an agreed upon "fair random method" shall be used to break the tie.

Benefits

Simplicity and Transparency

The calculations involved can be done by anyone with a simple calculator, using the election results from the states. Each state elections office would perform the calculations and present the electors allocation results along with its final official vote certification.

Security

It will be very difficult, and statistically improbable, for an organized effort to be able to distort enough states voter results to change the true proportional allocation of electors.

No Change to U.S. Constitution

There are no requirements to change the Constitution to employ proportional allocation of electors.

Adoptable by States

Since the manner by which electors are allocated is a state decision, no act of Congress is needed to mandate (or can prohibit) adopting proportional allocation of electors by the states. Thus, citizen led movements can organize in the states to create ballot initiatives to force its adoption in their states.

More and Better Candidates

Because the current lock on electors by the major parties will be broken, more and better candidates will emerge, who will have inherent grassroots support. They can organize locally within the states to garner enough electoral clout to push people's issues from the ground up. The major parties, and the major press, can no longer ignore these candidates, and the concerns of the people they represent.

Civil and Intelligent Campaigns

With higher quality candidates, who have inherent grassroots support, campaigns will invariably be more about issues and outcomes, versus personalities and posturing. The broad interests of the majority of the people will have to be acknowledged, addressed, and accommodated by candidates, if they wish to have a realistic chance of getting enough electors to vote for them at the Electoral College.

Voter Turnout Increase

When people across the categorization spectrum feel they have candidates that speak to their issues and interests, and know voting for them will have an actual positive affect on who becomes president, they will consistently participate in campaigns and vote at higher levels than under the current system.

Nationally Reflective Electoral Outcomes

With higher quality candidates who speak intelligently and thoughtfully to a majority of the people's interests, a truer national consensus on issues, and how to accommodate them, will be politically crafted. This will not only occur at the Presidential level, but will naturally spill over to Congress, since the elected President will be seen to have a truer national mandate to act on the various issues.

More Democracy

All these factors will create a country where government and politics must operate to more satisfy the will, desire, and concerns of the majority of people, i.e., the country will be ruled by *We The People*.

New Campaign Realities

Replacing the near universal system of *winner-take-all*, with a true universal one based on proportional allocation of electors by the states, will create solely as a consequence of its mathematical construction, a whole new set of campaign and election realities. The game will now be fundamentally changed. This will mandate a new set of effective campaign and election strategies to be devised, to work under this new paradigm. In the end, the math alone creates more fair and reasonable election outcomes, that will be inherently more legitimate, and acceptable to, and reflective of, the majority of the population.

The Decline of Two Party Dominance

The Democratic and Republican Parties have deliberately created their current electoral hegemony of electors by imposing the *winner-take-all* paradigm on their allocation, thus mathematically preventing all other potential candidates from having real chances to effectively challenge them. This hegemony will be fundamentally altered under the system of proportional allocation of electors.

Under proportional allocation the concept of blue and red states essentially becomes meaningless. The two current major parties will no longer be able to campaign almost exclusively in their stronghold states, and would actually have to run campaigns that appeal to broad sectors of people in every state, because getting every possible elector would now really matter.

It should be noted, the dominance of just two parties, and their control over the allocation of electors, is historically fairly recent, arising most prominently after the Civil War Post-Reconstruction era. But this is not how the system started, nor was it the intent of *The Framers* of the Constitution.

After the ratification of the Constitution in 1787, the first Presidential Election was held in 1788, with the next two in 1792 and 1796. These first 3 elections had no separate candidates for Vice President. However by the fourth Election of 1800, there were now separate candidates for each office, and the election was forced into the House to chose each office, as no candidate received a majority of the (then small) Electoral College vote. The messiness of this election (and also 1796) caused Congress to propose the 12th Amendment in 1803, which was officially ratified by 3/4's of the states in June 1804, before that year's Presidential Election. It's provisions first came into use in the 1824 Election, which was sent to the House for determination under its new rules.

Thus while political parties existed at the writing of the Constitution, no prominence, or provisions for their existence, were even alluded to in the Constitution by *The Framers*. The purpose of elections were to select good candidates for both offices, to head the Executive Branch, and it was the task of electors to deliberate (again without prominent regard to parties) among themselves and choose them.

Under proportional allocation of electors, we revert more back to the original intent of *The Framers*. There will be a diversity of pledged electors who will cast votes for more than one candidate in each state, forcing, potentially on a regular basis, elections to the House, unless acceptable/good candidates are put forward by the parties that the requisite majority of electors feel comfortable voting for.

The Prominence of Good Candidates

With the decline of total dominance by the major parties, voters will become more focused on hearing different candidates, and actually voting for the one who they feel most comfortable with. This will occur because voters will know that such a candidate could receive electors in their state and be their voice in the Electoral College, and have to be reckoned with.

The goal of third-parties and independents is not to necessarily win the election outright, but to receive enough electors to force the major party candidates to negotiate with them for their their pledged electors votes, to win in the Electoral College. If the major party candidates don't accommodate them, and the election is sent to the House of Representatives, the vote is not just between the major party candidates for President, but between the highest three Electoral College vote receivers [12th Amend.].

Thus you may likely see a Bernie Sanders type candidate determine it would be better to run as a third-party, or independent, candidate instead of jumping through hoops to get a majority party nomination. Such candidates would certainly do well in large electors states with low ETs, and target their resources on states with the best costs/benefits ratios, instead of trying to run a traditional national campaign.

In fact, unless the major parties are significantly transformed as they currently exist and are controlled, it will become the preference for good candidates with national prominence and following to eschew the parties and campaign directly to the people without wasting time, money, and resources on winning party primaries. They will just choose to take the independent/third-party path, like John Anderson did in 1980, Ross Perot did in 1992–1996, and Ralph Nader did in 1996–2000, and can then run ideological and policy pure elections, without worrying about satisfying party insiders, or a resistant party base.

This new reality will likewise force the major parties to change, or else continue to lose prominence and power. In fact, it would be to their benefit to select widely acceptable candidates, or even recruit a Sanders like candidate if necessary, realizing they would need to create a winnable coalition to present to voters before the election, or be run over. It would be highly unlikely, and certainly unwise, for them to repeat the scenario of the 2016 Election, and nominate candidates such as Trump and Clinton, each with astoundingly high negative voter ratings.

Thus, more good people (smart, skilled, rational, caring, diverse) will now decide it wouldn't be an act of insanity/futility to consider running for President, and put their feet into the electoral waters, and see how far they can swim. The ultimate beneficiaries, thankfully, will be you, me, us – the country.

Increased Voter Turnout

With more good and acceptable candidates to choose from, there will be a significant increase in voter turnout. The greatest deterrent to voter turnout hasn't been the mechanical barriers normally identified, but a lack of inspiring candidates to motivate voters to even care about coming out to vote. As videos showing people shopping on Black Friday display, people who wouldn't bother to vote a few weeks earlier will get up early, and wait in the cold, rain, or snow, and fight (literally) through insurmountable barriers, to get what they want at stores, if they think it's a good deal for them.

When voters have candidates they genuinely feel will work in their interests they will be inspired, and fight through barriers to get to the polls to vote, in greater numbers heretofore unseen. Proportionally allocating electors will create the basis for these outcomes to occur.

Changed Press Coverage

Evan McMullin was a candidate for President on the ballot in the 2016 Election in Utah. If you didn't live in Utah it's highly unlikely you heard of him before now. He received no national press coverage but still received 21.31% of Utah's vote, and would have received one proportionally allocated elector.

Press coverage of a candidate's campaign is a major determiner of its viability. If no one knows you exist it's unlikely a lot of people are going to vote for you. Even though Evan McMullin was known well enough in Utah to get 21.31% of its popular vote, from the major/national news media perspective he was a nobody, as he posed no mathematical threat to affect the outcome of the election.

Under proportional allocation, the "main stream" press, to maintain any sense of national legitimacy, would have to start covering viable candidates in each state, which means their views, issues, and platforms would have to be presented to the country for people to assess. They no longer could just be exclusive channels for the major parties to use, no matter how much money they payed them. They would start looking pretty stupid if candidates they never covered, and informed people of, started receiving electors and affecting the election outcomes.

Also, the horse race style coverage of presidential elections will now be greatly diminished, because it will no longer be just a race between whoever the major parties end up nominating. Coverage of insipid vagaries of personalities will have to be overshadowed by issues of policy and performance, and real facts and nuance will have to be injected into the conversation and coverage of the state elections.

The press will also have to overcome its anxiety and fear of providing anything more than two possible outcomes of an election. Whether deliberate, or unintentional, the presentation of the complexity and nuance of issues, especially elections, seems to be treated to be avoided at all costs. Does the press think people are unable to understand complexity and nuance, or is it they do think people are able to?

But the natural relative complexity (compared to *winner-take-all*) that proportional allocation would introduce into elections is one of the hallmarks of true democracy. The *projection/prediction game* the media is so eager to engage in, now years in advance of presidential elections, will have less weight, and be less useful, for all the reasons previously outlined.

Election night coverage, however, will be more exciting and dramatic. It will be easy to determine the allocation of electors for each state (faster than currently), after a statistically sufficient count of their popular vote occurs, but now multiple candidates will receive some. No longer will the press be able to "call" an election before the west coast states polls have even closed. Only as the polls close from the eastern states time zones westward, and the election night maps of multiple candidates electors totals start to fill in as they do, will we then get some sense of the choice of the national electorate.

Over time the press and media will be forced to cover elections as if the interests of voters, not those of the parties, are the true driving force behind them. Major media in particular can no longer pre-select and promote/push down the throats of people just certain major party candidates, to the oblivion of all others. And if the major media doesn't change and do this, its growing competition likely will.

Hopefully, all media will rise to meet this new electoral paradigm, and provide the necessary, relevant, and contextually factual, important, and timely information people will need to vote wisely.

Voter Suppression is Suppressed

Under *winner-take-all* voter suppression tactics mathematically work because the goal is simply to prevent certain groups (historically blacks and non-whites) from being voters, or to cast votes, and/or have them counted correctly. Proportional allocation essentially eliminates the feasibility of this tactic.

Pie Math

Take for example the results from Michigan in the 2016 Election. This was the last state to determine who would receive its *winner-take-all* 16 electors (which by then only added more electors to Trump's winning total). After an official count of over 4.8 million recorded votes, it came down to a difference of 10,704 between Trump and Clinton. Officially Trump received 2,279,543 (47.26%) and Clinton 2,268,839 (47.04%), but Trump got all 16 electors [1].

Michigan was one of the states Green Party candidate Jill Stein waged an effort in, not to just have a hand recount of the recorded cast votes, but to have counted for the first time on the order of 75,000 unrecorded votes [6], particularly in Detroit, a Democratic stronghold in a Republican controlled state. The Republicans went to court (as they did in every state Stein attempted to get real recounts done) to block reconciling Michigan's vote results discrepancies, and the courts agreed to prevent it every time.

Using *pie math* we can see why traditional Republican suppression tactics are effective under *winner-take-all* but become ineffective, and infeasible, when electors are allocated proportionally.

Consider each state as a nice yummy pie of N electors, where for Michigan N=16. In the 2016 Election Republicans controlled the governor's office and state government, and thus controlled the mechanics of how the election would be conducted. Under *winner-take-all* that yummy pie wasn't treated as 16 separate pieces but one whole pie, where the voting pool pie size determined who would get it.

The Michigan Secretary of State website [7] lists 4,874,619 recorded cast votes (out of 7.5+ million registered voters) in the 2016 Election, but only 4,799,284 votes were recorded being cast for president [8], an under count of 75,335 cast votes for president. This was the discrepancy Jill Stein was trying to reconcile, and Greg Palast reported on [6], and which the Michigan courts shut down resolving. This doesn't even include the pre-election suppression of the voting pool size with tactics such as voter ids.

So it's easy to see here, the mathematical imperatives of *winner-take-all* game strategies mandate that since every single vote can determine the winning outcome (because all your candidate has to do is get one more vote than anybody else) then simply reduce the number of votes your opponent can generate, or have recorded as receiving, and you can "win", where win here means getting the whole yummy pie.

Under proportional allocation two (2) fundamental mathematical characteristics of the game change:
1) the pie now is mathematically broken up into N distinct pieces that can/must be *won separately*, and
2) at a sufficient size, any voter turnout is a representative statistical sample of true voter preferences.
Here "win" means getting as many electors as (reasonably) possible, and not necessarily the whole pie.

Thus, even the level of black voter suppression the Republicans achieved would not have altered the true proportional electors allocation, because they (or Clinton) never would have gotten all of them anyway. If either candidate's PV totals differed by even +/- 150,000+ more votes they statistically would still have ended up with just 8 electors.

But Michigan wasn't the only state in the 2016 Election where voter suppression in *winner-take-all* states was mathematically effective, and allowed to work. In Wisconsin 2,979,150 recorded votes were cast and Trump won by 22,748 and received all 10 electors. In Pennsylvania 6,163,012 recorded votes were cast and Trump won by 44,292 and got all 16 electors. In North Carolina, where massive and "surgically precise" racial suppression was conducted, it was numerically more effective. Out of a recorded vote of 4,741,564 Trump won by 173,315, to get all 15 electors. However, Trump still didn't get a majority of the cast votes (the case for all these states) receiving 49.83% and Clinton 46.17%.

Under proportional allocation Trump and Clinton, being the only candidates to satisfy the ET for these states, would have split their electors in half, which would have truly reflected the preferences of the majority of voters. And this would have been the case whether Trump or Clinton would have received +/- tens of thousands more votes. It would be mathematically infeasible, and mechanically too difficult, to effectively suppress enough voters, and/or change enough votes, to statistically alter the true results.

This last point should not be lost on people who want to actually see true and fair election results. You can pass all the legislation you want to enforce fair elections, but if you don't control the mechanics of the implementation of the process whoever does ultimately controls who can (will) win. It matters not who cast the votes, it matters only who counts them.

Proportional allocation's mathematical foundation inherently acts as a deterrent to voting suppression efforts. It removes *single-point of attack* scenarios created with *winner-take-all*. An effort now cannot focus on just a few states, to control the voter/votes of one group of people in them, to alter an election. It now has to manipulate the vote tally of nearly every state, in a statistically effective and believable manner, in order to successfully produce an artificial deterministic outcome on a national scale.

Using Michigan again, its ET (votes) was: $4,874,619 \div 16 = 304,663.6875 \rightarrow 304,664$ votes. Thus, to be able to deterministically shift just one elector an effective difference of 304,664 votes must occur. This means if the Republicans wanted to change what would have been an 8|8 electors split between Trump and Clinton to get just one more elector to make it 9|7 for Trump, they would have to add enough votes to Trump, and/or subtract enough from Clinton, such that the total difference is at least this amount.

Thus it would be a prodigious task, and take a herculean effort, to identify and account for all the necessary variables, and their statistical interplay in real time, to deterministically alter enough state results in such a manner that is not only undetectable, but also numerically sufficient, to change the national election results to something that would not have occurred naturally.

Undoubtedly people will attempt to devise ways to effectively corrupt fair elections under proportional allocation, but now they will have to create more obviously nefarious, and illegal, schemes to do so, and at much greater costs (financial and prison). And this is the ultimate question would be schemers would have to answer; is it possible to simultaneously create deterministic election results in multiple states, without exposure, and would it ultimately be worth the costs of attempting to do so anyway?

Empowerment of Minorities

Elections are about political power, and politics is about who gets "stuff", and who doesn't. From its formal Declaration of creation, this country has always been a social and political quilt – a stitched patchwork of diverse people's competing interests. For the majority of this time indigenous and black people were formally and forcibly denied by the white male dominant population from participating in the process of deciding who got what, and how much, and thus were unable to promote their interests.

With passage of seminal so-called *Civil Rights* legislation in the 1960s, blacks were able to ameliorate some of the most onerous conditions of their oppression. But the white power structure has continued to structurally limit the political power of black people (and the growing non-white population) at the national level through the *quiet consequences* of maintaining *winner-take-all* for presidential elections.

Article 1, Section 2 stipulates: "The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative;"

Thus, House of Representatives members are supposed to represent a district of about 30,000 people. As the states and population increased, a commensurate increase in House members should occur, and thus the number of electors from each state. This has not adequately proportionally occurred, with a commensurate structural diminishment in the electoral power of particularly minority voting blocks.

For first Election of 1788 there were 69 electors, which doubled to 138 for the 1800 fourth Election, which grew to 447 from 43 states for the 1900 Election. It stayed there until jumping to 483 from 46 states for the 1908 Election until settling at 531 electors from 48 states starting with the 1912 Election. It stayed at 531 until 1959 when Alaska and Hawaii became states 49 and 50, each with the minimum 3 electors, so for the 1960 Election the number of electors was 537. Then a curious thing happened.

The 23rd Amendment (proposed 1960, ratified 1961) gave DC three (3) electors, but the total count only went up 1 to 538 (instead of 540) and has remained static for all the elections since 1964. In the 1964 Election the recorded presidential popular vote was 70.6 million, which doubled to 137 million for the 2016 Election. This constriction of representatives has structurally diluted the potential voting power of all demographically diverse people, but especially historically oppressed racial minorities, and now other growing non-whites and demographically distinct groups (Muslims, gays, seniors, etc).

Proportional allocation of electors will for the first time provide an effective structural means for all demographically diverse groups to formulate and push their own agendas, and no longer just beg and hope the major party candidates will. Coalitions of union members, blacks, Latinos, gays, women, et al, can create and organize around agendas and run/support favorable candidates, especially in elector rich states like California, New York, Texas, Ohio, etc, and easily win multiple electors nationwide.

It is incumbent upon these groups to understand the potential enormous political power, and benefits, they could create by/for themselves under this system. The battle will be the fight to eliminate the influence of the various *gate keepers* of these groups to prevent them from understanding this, and then acting to exercise this power. *Winner-take-all* acts to maintain the traditional political power of a declining white male population, thru the two major parties, over a growing and diverse population, while proportionally allocating electors creates a system that can be used to disperse political power more evenly and equitably.

Past Elections Analysis

We can apply the process for proportionally allocating electors to past elections to see the affect on them. However, while it's simple to accurately compute them they are still artificial results. It's like trying to compare baseball players from different eras. While its ostensibly the same game, the real differences in the rules, and other factors that would affect players performances, make playing the game different, which makes player comparisons highly speculative.

So as explained, elections held under the paradigm of proportional allocation will be conducted under different rules and factors than under *winner-take-all*. Though its the same game, it's played different. Still, seeing how past elections would have played out under proportional allocation is instructive, as they show a facsimile of outcomes under it, even though they can't show how the players would have altered their playing to maximize their chances of winning under it.

At the end of this paper are the election results from 2016 - 1992, whose results I'll summarize and comment upon here.

2016

This election is the 21st Century poster child for widely held dissatisfaction with the Electoral College. Two highly disliked major party candidates, an upset win (to most, but not all, people), and subsequent calls to abolish the Electoral College. Because of *winner-take-all* it wasn't really that close; Trump trumped Clinton pulling away, 304 electors to 227. But hey, mathematically astute readers will note, that's only 531 electors, instead of 538. Yes, this election was so contentious and disheartening, that seven (7) pledged electors to Trump and Clinton wouldn't even vote for them, with three (3) Clinton electors ending up voting for Colin Powell (a Republican who wasn't even a primary candidate).

The seven electors who didn't vote for their pledged candidates instead of being labeled as "faithless electors" were acting as intended by *The Framers*. They assessed the qualifications of the candidates, and without regard to party affiliation, chose candidates for President and Vice President they felt were best to serve the interests of the country.

While Trump won easily under *winner-take-all* the proportional allocation results show otherwise. Under proportional allocation Trump (267) and Clinton (266) almost tied, with neither getting the requisite 270 electors to win in the Electoral College, and three (3) other candidates got electors, with Gary Johnson (3) the most. Thus, if the Electoral College vote didn't create a win, the House would then have to pick from Trump, Clinton, and Johnson for president, if they remained the top 3 vote getters from the Electoral College.

Proportional allocation would have revealed the existing close split of the 2016 electorate, which was masked under *winner-take-all*. In fact, if the 2016 Election was done under proportional allocation of electors, it is highly unlikely Trump and Clinton would have been their party candidates, and Bernie Sanders might have run (as the Democrat nominee, or Independent), and he would have been starting the first term of his presidency in 2017.

We'll never know what proportional allocation would have produced for the 2016 Election, but we certainly do with *winner-take-all*.

2012 & 2008

For the Obama elections of 2008 and 2012, proportionally allocating electors create no paper change to the actual election results. Computationally Obama receives fewer electors, while McCain and Romney receive more, and no other candidates satisfy the ET of any state to receive an elector.

2004

Proportional allocation of electors also doesn't change the outcome of the second George W. Bush election win, over John Kerry. In fact, the final count only differs by four (4) electors, with Bush/Kerry losing/winning 4 electors. No other candidates did well enough to get an elector from any state.

2000

The famous Florida "hanging chads" election, maybe surprisingly, still would have resulted in a George W. Bush win over Al Gore if electors were proportionally allocated, using the election's data. In fact, even though Ralph Nader would have gotten three (3) electors, Bush's electors count only went down one (1), from 271 to 270, still giving him the minimum necessary to win in the Electoral College.

Thus, Nader's presence in the election under the paradigm of *winner-take-all* was inconsequential to its outcome.

1996 & 1992

If proportional allocation of electors was used for these elections it's highly likely the country would have been inexorably changed. Let's start with the 1992 Election.

The 1992 Election provides an excellent example of what future elections will be like when the major parties are challenged by a candidate with money, national name recognition, press coverage, and a compelling message. Under *winner-take-all* H. Ross Perot received 18.91% of the popular vote, against Bill Clinton's 43.01% and George Bush's 37.45%, but received no electors for all his effort and public support. Clinton's 43% got him 370 electors, while Bush got the rest (168).

However, if allocated proportionally Perot ends up with 90 electors, Clinton drops to 240, and Bush's climbs to 208. No one now is anywhere close to 270, and this election would have gone to the House to decide, unless Clinton or Bush could have "persuaded" Perot to get his electors to vote for them in the Electoral College (or vice versa).

For the rematch in 1996 between Clinton and Perot, with now Robert Dole the Republican candidate and Ralph Nader for the Green Party, all four would have received electors under proportional allocation. Clinton (as the incumbent) this time would have gotten enough to win in the Electoral College outright, but 101 fewer than he received under *winner-take-all*.

If proportional allocation had been the basis for conducting these elections they would have set a firm foundation and springboard for alternative candidates for future elections. Instead Perot's candidacy has been largely forgotten and/or portrayed as a historical oddity, by most.

Into the Future

Fundamental structural electoral change is hard, but not impossible, nor insurmountable. It certainly won't take (probably) another Civil War, at least not the shooting type. It will ultimately come down to an effort of social and political engineering. All that needs to happen is for enough people to want it to happen, identify and assess the possible opposition, then act to effectively overcome it until successful.

The alternative to using some form of proportional allocation of electors to replace *winner-take-all* is some form of using the national popular vote as the basis for electing the president, whether directly or indirectly. However, while many people promote it, because on its face it seems to sound so logical, there are real problems with it, and reasons *The Framers* decided not to use it to elect the President.

Popular Vote Problems

The first thing most people will cite as wrong with the Electoral College is that someone can win the national popular vote total but lose in the Electoral College. But, of course, *The Framers* not only anticipated this, but created the system to allow this to regularly occur. They wanted to mitigate the possibility of a *charismatic tyrant* from becoming President, who could just merely appeal to the base instincts of the majority to the detriment of minorities (they thought states, I think their people). Thus, 2 of the first 10 elections ended up decided in the House, and many more probably should have since.

Winner-take-all is just a state level implementation of majority tyrannical rule using state popular votes. A candidate isn't even required to win the majority of the popular vote, but just to get more votes than anybody else. One simple way to make winner-take-all be at least mathematically more democratic is to require that the winner receive the majority of the popular vote. Presumably this was a major reason that in the 2016 Election Maine voters passed a ballot initiative [3,4] making it the first state to adopt Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) [2] to conduct all state and federal elections, except for President.

The national use of RCV to elect the president would be a first level facsimile to proportional allocating electors. Even in states where major party candidates normally win a popular vote majority it will allow voters to more comfortably express their preference on issues in voting for candidates, versus settling on the *lesser-of-evils* candidates. This will inspire more disgruntled and marginalized voting groups to vote in greater numbers, and increase alternative and *native son* candidates chances in the future.

In traditionally competitive states RCV will now force major party candidates to appeal to first choice voters of other candidates as their second choice. This will force campaigns in these states to be more issue centric and civil, to appeal to as many potential voters as possible. This would now be true for the elections of all offices too, creating even more voter interest and greater turnout statewide.

RCV would also be a better mechanism to avert a *charismatic tyrant* under a pure national popular vote system than a straight vote for one candidate for president by voters. (Of course, I also propose its use in the unlikely situation where no candidate in a state receives the ET under proportional allocation.)

But RCV can't change the fundamental issue that candidates would naturally campaign most frequently and longest in the highest population centers. Why bother campaigning in Montana, the fourth largest state in area but only 44th largest population (just a million+ in 2016), or go to Alaska or Hawaii (OK, maybe Hawaii)? All the flyover states and areas the major candidates ignore now would just increase.

But no matter how good some people may think using some form of a national popular vote may be, to get it formally implemented requires a change to the Constitution. This is highly unlikely to occur, as amending the Constitution to do this would run into massive opposition from a wide range of groups, for various reasons.

To create a runaround for the need to amend the Constitution, and its opposition, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact [9] was created to require the electors within the Compact states to vote for the candidate who wins the national popular vote. By the end of 2016 eleven (11) states had passed laws to make this happen, all traditional Democratic stronghold states.

Thus, popular vote initiatives have mostly been proposed by Democratic groups after they lose an election, and not generally to make the system fair and equitable for all candidates. Presumably, if Republicans would ever win the popular vote, but lose the Electoral College, they would join in too.

A Better System

There are multiple issues with voting and the mechanics of elections in this country that always seem to get brushed under the rug until the next election and then become highlighted again. Most of the focus is trained on the mechanics: voter registration, machines, training of poll workers, ballots, hacking, etc. Relatively much less concern/thinking is devoted to structurally making elections create outcomes that are as fundamentally democratic (they express a consensus will of a majority of people) as possible.

This country is increasingly becoming more demographically diverse: more non-white, non-Christian, and non-Democrat/Republican, every election. By pure math alone, it's creating a politically evolving country that will not only look drastically different 20 years from now, but will act differently too. It would be in the interest of the old white majority to ensure the system will protect their minority rights.

We have a system that chooses the President based on the selection, allocation, and vote of electors. That is an empirical fact which will not change in any foreseeable time frame regardless of how people feel about it. We currently have an implementation of that system that is conceived, constructed and controlled by and for the benefit the two (current) major parties. In the five elections from 2000–2016 it has created outcomes in every election that have antagonized a significant number of the population, with many finding their outcomes unacceptable and/or illegitimate. Something better is necessary.

At some point the idea of *representative power sharing* must be accepted in this country, or it will no longer exist as a politically unified entity. Power sharing cannot exist when the system is designed to allocate power greedily, where one person/group wins and everyone else loses, even when everyone else may be the majority of the people.

Proportional allocation of electors not only acts to create a mathematical and mechanical process for power sharing, it more importantly begins to create the psychological acceptance of the need to engage in the actions of political power sharing, because it forces candidates to have to listen and respond to the ideas, concerns, and issues from a greater number of people, in order to win. The process itself will force more candidates to have to care about how, and who, they must accommodate in order to govern.

The beauty is, all this is in the hands of the American people, if they but just choose to make it happen.

Conclusion

The adoption of proportional allocation of electors presented herein is simple, transparent, easy to perform by anyone, produces completely reproducible results from the same data, and is mechanically devoid of any partisan considerations. It will thus create an electoral structure that will allow for greater inclusion of more ideas and voices, and produce more civil, intelligent, and representative campaigns.

The major opponents to this system will undoubtedly be the beneficiaries (and their supporters) of the current *winner-take-all* system. However, the turmoil and dissatisfaction with the 2016 Elections have many voices demanding a better way to elect a President, that creates a fairer and more representative outcome, and can be seen as more legitimate and acceptable by the majority of *We The People*.

Paper Availability

This latest version of this paper is available online at the following location.

https://www.scribd.com/document/334089061/Case-for-Proportional-Allocation-of-Electors

Feedback

I welcome feedback, suggestions, and citations of errors and errata via email.

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	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 2016 Presidential Election													
	State		Doi	nald Trur	np	Hill	ary Clinto	on	Ga	ry John	son	J	ill Steir	ı
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
AL	9	11.11	62.1	5.589	6	34.4	3.095	3	3.0		0	0.4		0
AK	3	33.33	51.3	1.539	2	36.6	1.097	1	5.9		0	0.8		0
AZ	11	9.09	48.1	5.291	6	44.6	4.906	5	4.1		0	1.3		0
AR	6	16.66	60.6	3.636	4	33.7	2.022	2	2.6		0	2.2		0
CA	55	1.81	31.5	17.35	18	61.5	33.83	34	3.4	1.87	2	2.0	1.1	1
CO	9	11.11	43.3	3.906	4	48.2	4.338	5	5.2		0	1.4		0
CT	7	14.28	40.9	2.863	3	54.5	3.815	4	3.0		0	1.4		0
DE	3	33.33	41.9	1.257	1	53.4	1.602	2	3.3		0	1.4		0
DC	3	33.33	4.1		0	90.9	default	3	1.6		0	1.4		0
FL	29	3.45	48.6	14.094	15	47.4	13.746	14	2.2		0	0.7		0
GA	16	6.25	50.6	8.096	8	45.4	7.264	8	3.0		0			
HI	4	25.0	30.0	1.20	1	62.2	2.488	3	3.7		0	3.0		0
ID	4	25.0	59.3	2.372	3	27.5	1.10	1	4.1		0	1.2		0
IL	20	5.0	39.5	7.9	8	55.5	11.1	12	3.8		0	1.4		0
IN	11	9.09	56.2	6.182	7	37.9	4.169	4	4.9		0	0.3		0
IA	6	16.66	51.2	3.132	3	41.7	2.502	3	3.8		0	0.7		0
KS	6	16.66	56.6	3.396	4	36.1	2.166	2	4.7		0	2.0		0
KT	8	12.5	62.5	5.0	5	32.7	2.616	3	2.8		0	0.7		0
LA	8	12.5	58.1	4.648	5	38.5	3.081	3	1.9		0	0.7		0
ME	4	25.0	44.9	1.796	2	47.8	1.912	2	5.1		0	1.9		0
MD	10	10.0	33.9	3.39	4	60.3	6.03	6	2.9		0	1.3		0
MA	11	9.09	32.8	3.608	4	60.0	6.6	7	4.1		0	1.4		0
MI	16	6.25	47.5	7.60	8	47.3	7.56	8	3.6		0	1.1		0
MN	10	10.0	44.9	4.49	5	46.4	4.64	5	3.9	1	0	1.8	1	0
MS	6	16.66	57.9	3.474	4	40.1	2.406	2	1.2		0	0.3		0
MO	10	10.9	57.8	5.78	6	38.1	3.81	4	3.5		0	0.9		0
MT	3	33.33	56.1	1.683	2	35.8	1.07	1	5.6		0	1.6		0
NB	5	20.0	58.8	2.94	3	33.7	1.685	2	4.6		0	1.0		0
NV	6	16.66	45.5	2.73	3	47.9	2.874	3	3.3		0			
NH	4	25.0	46.5	1.86	2	46.8	1.872	2	4.1		0	0.9		0
NJ	14	7.14	41.0	5.74	6	55.0	7.70	8	1.9		0	1.0		0

	rq	oporti	ional A	Allocati	ion o	f Elec	tors for	the 2	2016 F	reside	ential	Electio	on	
	State		Doi	nald Trur	np	Hill	ary Clinto	on	Ga	ry Johns	son	J	ill Stein	1
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
NM	5	20.0	40.0	2.0	2	48.3	2.415	3	9.3		0	1.2		0
NY	29	3.45	36.4	10.556	11	59.0	17.11	18	2.3		0	1.4		0
NC	15	6.66	49.9	7.485	8	46.2	6.93	7	2.7		0	0.3		0
ND	3	33.33	63.0	default	3	27.2		0	6.2		0	1.1		0
ОН	18	5.55	51.3	9.234	10	43.2	7.776	8	3.2		0	0.8		0
OK	7	14.28	62.3	4.361	5	28.9	2.023	2	5.8		0			
OR	7	14.28	39.1	2.737	3	50.1	3.507	4	4.7		0	2.5		0
PA	20	5.0	48.2	9.64	10	47.5	9.5	10	2.4		0	0,8		0
RI	4	25.0	38.9	1.556	2	54.4	2.176	2	3.2		0	1.3		0
SC	9	11.11	54.9	4.941	5	40.7	3.663	4	2.3		0	0.6		0
SD	3	33.33	61.5	default	3	31.7		0	5.6		0	1.1		0
TN	11	9.09	61.1	6.721	7	34.9	3.839	4	2.8		0	0,6		0
TX	38	2.63	52.2	19.836	20	43.2	16.416	17	3.2	1.216	1	0.8		0
UT	6	16.66	45.1	2.706	3	27.2	1.623	2	3.5		0	0.8		0
									Eva	n McMı	ıllin	21.3	1.278	1
VT	3	33.33	30.3		0	56.7	default	3	3.2		0	2.1		0
VA	13	7.69	44.4	5.772	6	49.8	6.474	7	3.0		0	0.7		0
WA	12	8.33	36.9	4.428	5	52.6	6.312	7	4.9		0	1.8		0
WV	5	20.0	67.9	3.395	4	26.2	1.31	1	3.2		0	1.1		0
WI	10	10.0	47.2	4.72	5	46.4	4.64	5	3.6		0	1.0		0
WY	3	33.33	68.2	default	3	21.9		0	5.2		0	1.0		0
	538				267			266			3			1

Results for Proportional Allocation of Electors for 2016 Election, and change from official results.

Donald Trump	Hillary Clinton	Gary Johnson	Jill Stein	Evan McMullin
Republican	Democrat	Libertarian	Green	Independent
267 (-37)	266 (+39)	3 (+3)	1 (+1)	1 (+1)

- In Hawaii, for President: One Clinton Elector voted for Bernie Sanders.
- In Texas, for President: One Trump Elector voted for John Kasich; One Trump Elector voted for Ron Paul.
- In Washington, for President: Three Clinton Electors voted for Colin Powell; One Clinton Elector voted for Faith Spotted Eagle.
- In Washington, for Vice President, each individual received one vote: Elizabeth Warren, Susan Collins, Maria Cantwell, and Winona LaDuke.

Thus for the 2016 Election, no candidate receives a majority (270) of pledged electors to cast votes for them in the Electoral College. If no candidate received the votes of the majority of electors (270+) then pursuant to Article 2, Section 1, and 12th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution [5], the U.S. House of Representatives would vote to select the President, which occurred for the Elections of 1800 and 1824.

	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 2012 Presidential Election													
	State		Bar	ack Obar	na	Mi	tt Romne	ey	Gai	ry John	son	J	ill Steir	ı
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
AL	9	11.11	38.4	3.456	4	60.6	5.454	5	0.6		0			
AK	3	33.33	40.8	1.224	1	54.8	1.644	2	2.5		0	1.0		0
AZ	11	9.09	44.5	4.895	5	53.5	5.885	6	1.4		0	0.3		0
AR	6	16.66	36.9	2.214	2	60.6	3.636	4	1.5		0	0.9		0
CA	55	1.81	60.2	33.11	34	37.1	20.405	21	1.1		0	0.7		0
CO	9	11.11	51.5	4.635	5	46.1	4.149	4	1.4		0	0.3		0
CT	7	14.28	58.1	4.067	4	40.7	2.849	3	0.8		0	0.1		0
DE	3	33.33	58.6	1.758	2	40.0	1.20	1	0.9		0	0.5		0
DC	3	33.33	90.9	default	3	7.3		0	0.7		0	8.0		0
FL	29	3.448	49.9	14.471	15	49.0	14.2	14	0.5		0			
GA	16	6.25	45.4	7.253	7	53.2	8.512	9	1.2		0			
HI	4	25.0	70.6	2.824	3	27.8	1.112	1	0.9		0	0.7		0
ID	4	25.0	32.4	1.296	1	64.1	2.564	3	1.4		0	0.7		0
IL	20	5.0	57.5	11.5	12	40.7	8.14	8	1.1		0	0.6		0
IN	11	9.09	43.8	4.818	5	54.0	5.94	6	1.9		0			
IA	6	16.66	52.0	3.12	3	46.2	2.772	3	0.8		0			
KS	6	16.66	38.0	2.28	2	59.6	3.576	4	1.8		0			
KT	8	12.5	37.8	3.024	3	60.5	4.84	5	1.0		0	0.4		0
LA	8	12.5	40.6	3.248	3	57.8	4.624	5	0.9		0	0.4		0
ME	4	25.0	56.3	2.252	2	41.0	1.640	2	1.3		0	1.1		0
MD	10	10.0	62.0	6.20	6	35.9	3.59	4	1.1		0	0.6		0
MA	11	9.09	60.7	6.677	7	37.5	4.125	4	1.0		0	0.6		0
MI	16	6.25	54.0	8.64	9	44.6	7.136	7				0.5		0
MN	10	10.0	52.7	5.27	5	45.0	4.5	5	1.2		0	0.4		0
MS	6	16.66	43.8	2.628	3	55.3	3.317	3	0.5		0	0.1		0
MO	10	10.9	44.3	4.43	5	53.6	5.36	5	1.6		0			
MT	3	33.33	41.7	1.251	1	55.3	1.659	2	2.9		0			
NB	5	20.0	38.0	1.90	2	59.8	2.990	3	1.4		0			
NV	6	16.66	52.4	3.144	3	45.7	2.742	3	1.1		0			
NH	4	25.0	52.0	2.08	2	46.4	1.856	2	1.1		0			
NJ	14	7.14	58.3	8.162	8	40.5	5.67	6	0.6		0	0.3		0

	Pı	oporti	ional A	Allocati	ion o	f Elec	tors for	the 2	2012 F	reside	ential	Electio	n	
	State		Bar	ack Obai	ma	Mi	tt Romne	ey	Gai	ry Johns	son	J	ill Steir	n
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
NM	5	20.0	53.0	2.65	3	42.8	2.140	2	3.6		0	0.3		0
NY	29	3.448	63.4	18.386	19	35.2	10.208	10	0.7		0	0.6		0
NC	15	6.66	48.4	7.26	7	50.4	7.56	8	1.0		0			
ND	3	33.33	38.7	1.161	1	58.3	1.749	2	1.6		0			
ОН	18	5.55	50.6	9.108	9	47.6	8.568	9	0.9		0	0.3		0
OK	7	14.28	33.2	2.324	2	66.8	4.676	5						
OR	7	14.28	54.2	3.794	4	42.2	2.954	3	1.4		0	1.1		0
PA	20	5.0	52.0	10.4	11	46.6	9.32	9	0.9		0	0.4		0
RI	4	25.0	62.7	2.508	3	35.2	1.408	1	1.0		0	0.5		0
SC	9	11.11	44.1	3.969	4	54.6	4.914	5	8.0		0	0.3		0
SD	3	33.33	39.9	1.197	1	57.9	1.737	2	1.6		0			
TN	11	9.09	39.0	4.29	4	59.4	6.534	7	8.0		0	0.3		0
TX	38	2.63	41.4	15.732	16	57.1	21.698	22	1.1		0	0.3		0
UT	6	16.66	24.7	1.482	2	72.6	4.356	4	1.2		0	0.4		0
VT	3	33.33	66.6	default	3	31.0		0	1.2		0			
VA	13	7.69	51.2	6.656	7	47.3	6.149	6	8.0		0			
WA	12	8.33	55.8	6.696	7	41.0	4.921	5	1.3		0	0.7		0
WV	5	20.0	35.5	1.775	2	62.1	3.105	3	0.9		0	0.7		0
WI	10	10.0	52.8	5.28	5	45.9	4.59	5	0.7		0			
WY	3	33.33	27.8		0	68.6	default	3	2.1		0			
	538				277			261			0			0

Results for Proportional Allocation of Electors for 2012 Election, and change from official results.

Barack Obama	Mitt Romney	Gary Johnson	Jill Stein
Democrat	Republican	Libertarian	Green
277 (-55)	261 (+55)	0 ()	0 ()

Thus for the 2012 Election, Obama would receive greater than the minimum 270 pledged electors to cast votes for him in the Electoral College, and he would have become President.

	Pı	roporti	ional <i>A</i>	Allocatio	on o	f Elec	tors for	the 2	2008 P	reside	ntial	Electio	on	
	State		Bara	ack Oban	ıa	Jol	nn McCa	in						
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
AL	9	11.11	38.7	3.483	4	60.3	5.427	5						
AK	3	33.33	37.9	1.137	1	59.4	1.782	2						
AZ	10	10.0	44.9	4.49	5	53.4	5.34	5						
AR	6	16.66	38.9	2.334	2	58.7	3.522	4						
CA	55	1.81	60.9	33.495	34	36.9	20.295	21						
CO	9	11.11	53.7	4.833	5	44.7	4.023	4						
CT	7	14.28	60.6	4.242	4	38.2	2.674	3						
DE	3	33.33	61.9	1.857	2	36.9	1.107	1						
DC	3	33.33	92.5	default	3	6.5		0						
FL	27	3.703	50.9	13.743	14	48.1	12.987	13						
GA	15	6.66	46.9	7035	7	52.1	7.815	8						
HI	4	25.0	71.9	2.876	3	26.6	1.064	1						
ID	4	25.0	35.9	1.436	1	61.2	2.448	3						
IL	21	4.761	61.8	12.978	13	36.7	7.707	8						
IN	11	9.09	49.8	5.478	6	48.8	5.368	5						
IA	7	14.28	53.9	3.773	4	44.4	3.108	3						
KS	6	16.66	41.6	2.496	3	56.5	3.39	3						
KT	8	12.5	41.2	3.296	3	57.4	4.592	5						
LA	9	11.11	39.9	3.591	4	58.6	5.274	5						
ME	4	25.0	57.7	2.308	2	40.4	1.616	2						
MD	10	10.0	61.9	6.19	6	36.5	3.65	4						
MA	12	8.33	61.8	7.416	8	36.0	4.32	4						
MI	17	5.88	57.3	9.741	10	40.9	6.953	7						
MN	10	10.0	56.2	5.62	6	42.3	4.23	4						
MS	6	16.66	43.0	2.58	3	56.2	3.372	3						
MO	11	9.09	49.2	5.412	5	49.4	5.434	6						
MT	3	33.33	47.1	1.413	1	49.5	1.485	2						
NB	5	20.0	41.6	2.08	2	56.5	2.825	3						
NV	5	120.0	55.2	2.76	3	42.7	2.135	2						
NH	4	25.0	54.1	2.164	2	44.5	1.78	2						
NJ	15	6.66	57.1	8.565	9	41.6	6.24	6						

	rq	oporti	onal A	Allocation	on o	f Elec	tors for	the 2	2008 P	reside	ntial	Electic	n	
	State		Bara	ack Oban	ıa	Jol	nn McCa	in						
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
NM	5	20.0	56.9	2.845	3	41.8	2.09	2						
NY	31	3.22	62.9	19.499	20	36.0	11.16	11						
NC	15	6.66	49.7	7.455	8	49.4	7.41	7						
ND	3	33.33	44.5	1.335	1	53.2	1.596	2						
ОН	20	5.0	51.4	10.28	10	46.8	9.36	10						
OK	7	14.28	34.4	2.408	2	65.7	4.599	5						
OR	7	14.28	56.8	3.975	4	40.4	2.828	3						
PA	21	4.76	54.5	11.92	12	44.2	9.282	9						
RI	4	25.0	62.8	2.512	3	36.0	1.44	1						
SC	8	12.5	44.9	3.592	4	53.9	4.312	4						
SD	3	33.33	44.8	1.344	1	53.2	1.596	2						
TN	11	9.09	41.8	4.598	5	56.9	6.259	6						
TX	34	2.94	43.6	14.824	15	55.4	18.836	19						
UT	5	20.0	34.2	1.71	2	62.2	3.11	3						
VT	3	33.33	67.5	default	3	30.5		0						
VA	13	7.69	52.6	6.838	7	46.3	6.019	6						
WA	11	9.09	57.3	6.303	6	40.3	4.433	5						
WV	5	20.0	42.5	2.125	2	55.6	2.78	3						
WI	10	10.0	56.2	5.62	6	42.3	4.23	4						
WY	3	33.33	32.5		0	64.8	default	3						
	538				289			249						

Results for Proportional Allocation of Electors for 2008 Election, and change from official results.

Barack Obama Democrat	John McCain Republican	
289 (-76)	249 (+76)	

Thus for the 2008 Election, Obama would receive greater than the minimum 270 pledged electors to cast votes for him to become President in the Electoral College.

	Pı	roporti	ional A	Allocati	ion o	f Elec	tors for	the 2	2004 P	reside	ntial	Electio	n	
	State		Geo	rge W. B	ush	Jo	ohn Kerry	y						
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
AL	9	11.11	62.5	5.625	6	36.8	3.312	3						
AK	3	33.33	61.1	1.833	2	35.5	1.065	1						
AZ	10	10.0	54.8	5.48	6	44.3	4.43	4						
AR	6	16.66	54.3	3.258	3	44.6	2.676	3						
CA	55	1.81	44.4	24.42	25	54.3	29.865	30						
CO	9	11.11	51.7	4.653	5	47.0	4.23	4						
CT	7	14.28	44.0	3.08	3	54.3	3.801	4						
DE	3	33.33	45.7	1.371	1	53.3	1.599	2						
DC	3	33.33	9.3		0	89.2	default	3						
FL	27	3.703	52.1	14.067	14	47.1	12.717	13						
GA	15	6.66	57.9	8.685	9	41.3	6.195	6						
HI	4	25.0	45.3	1.812	2	54.0	2.16	2						
ID	4	25.0	68.4	3.136	3	30.4	1.216	1						
IL	21	4.76	44.5	9.345	9	54.8	11.508	12						
IN	11	9.09	59.9	6.589	7	39.3	4.323	4						
IA	7	14.28	49.9	3.493	4	49.2	3.444	3						
KS	6	16.66	62.0	3.72	4	36.6	2.196	2						
KT	8	12.5	59.5	4.76	5	39.7	3.176	3						
LA	9	11.11	56.7	5.103	5	42.2	3.798	4						
ME	4	25.0	44.6	1.782	2	53.6	2.144	2						
MD	10	10.0	55.9	5.59	6	42.9	4.29	4						
MA	12	8.33	36.8	4.415	4	61.9	7.428	8						
MI	17	5.882	47.8	8.126	8	51.2	8.704	9						
MN	10	10.0	47.6	4.76	5	51.1	5.11	5						
MS	6	16.66	59.4	3.564	4	39.8	2.388	2						
МО	11	9.09	53.3	5.863	6	46.1	5.071	5						
MT	3	33.33	59.1	1.773	2	38.6	1.158	1						
NB	5	20.0	65.9	3.295	3	32.7	1.635	2						
NV	5	20.0	50.5	2.525	3	47.9	2.395	2						
NH	4	25.0	48.9	1.956	2	50.2	2.008	2						
NJ	15	6.66	46.2	6.93	7	52.9	7.935	8						

	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 2004 Presidential Election													
	State		Geo	rge W. B	ush	Jo	hn Kerry	/						
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
NM	5	20.0	49.8	2.49	3	49.1	2.455	2						
NY	31	3.226	40.1	12.431	13	58.4	18.104	18						
NC	15	6.66	56.0	8.4	8	43.6	6.54	7						
ND	3	33.33	62.9	1.887	2	35.5	1.065	1						
ОН	20	5.0	50.8	10.16	10	48.7	9.74	10						
OK	7	14.28	65.6	4.592	5	34.4	2.408	2						
OR	7	14.28	47.2	3.304	3	51.4	3.598	4						
PA	21	4.761	48.4	10.164	10	50.9	10.689	11						
RI	4	25.0	36.8	1.472	1	61.9	2.476	3						
SC	8	12.25	58.0	5.64	5	40.9	3.272	3						
SD	3	33.33	59.1	1.773	2	38.4	1.152	1						
TN	11	9.09	56.8	6.245	6	42.5	4.675	5						
TX	34	2.941	61.1	20.774	21	38.2	12.989	13						
UT	5	20.0	71.5	3.475	4	26.0	13	1						
VT	3	33.33	38.8	1.164	1	58.9	1.767	2						
VA	13	7.69	53.7	6.981	7	45.5	5.915	6						
WA	11	9.09	45.6	5.016	5	52.8	5.808	6						
WV	5	20.0	56.1	2.805	3	43.2	2.16	2						
WI	10	10.0	49.3	4.93	5	49.7	4.97	5						
WY	3	33.33	68.9	default	3	29.1		0						
	538				282			256						

Results for Proportional Allocation of Electors for 2004 Election, and change from official results.

George W. Bush Republican	John Kerry Democrat	
282 (-4)	256 (+4)	

• In Minnesota, one Kerry Elector voted for John Edwards (President) and John Edwards (Vice President)

Thus for the 2004 Election, Bush would receive greater than the minimum 270 pledged electors to cast votes for him to become President in the Electoral College.

	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 2000 Presidential Election													
	State		Geo	rge W. B	ush	A	lbert Gor	e	Ra	lph Nad	er			
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
AL	9	11.11	56.5	5.085	5	41.6	3.744	4	1.1		0			
AK	3	33.33	58.2	default	3	26.7		0	10.1		0			
AZ	8	12.5	51.0	4.08	4	44.7	3.576	4	3.0		0			
AR	6	16.66	51.3	3.078	3	45.9	2.754	3	1.5		0			
CA	54	1.85	41.7	22.518	23	53.5	28.89	29	3.82	2.063	2			
СО	8	12.5	50.8	4.064	4	42.4	3.392	4	5.3		0			
CT	8	12.5	38.4	3.072	3	55.9	4.472	5	4.4		0			
DE	3	33.33	41.9	1.257	1	55.0	1.65	2	2.5		0			
DC	3	33.33	9.0		0	85.2	default	3	5.2		0			
FL	25	4.0	48.85	12.215	13	48.84	12.21	12	1.6		0			
GA	13	7.69	54.7	7.111	7	43.0	5.59	6	0.5		0			
HI	4	25.0	37.5	1.5	2	55.8	2.232	2	5.9		0			
ID	4	25.0	67.2	2.688	3	27.6	1.104	1	2.5		0			
IL	22	4.54	42.6	9.372	10	54.6	12.012	12	2.2		0			
IN	12	8.33	56.7	6.804	7	41.0	4.921	5	0.8		0			
IA	7	14.28	48.2	3.374	3	48.5	3.395	4	2.2		0			
KS	6	16.66	58.0	3.48	4	37.2	2.232	2	3.4		0			
KT	8	12.5	56.5	4.52	5	41.4	3.312	3	1.5		0			
LA	9	11.11	52.6	4.734	5	44.9	3.726	4	1.2		0			
ME	4	25.0	44.0	1.76	2	49.1	1.964	2	5.7		0			
MD	10	10.0	40.2	4.02	4	56.6	5.66	6	2.7		0			
MA	12	8.33	32.5	3.9	4	59.8	7.176	8	6.4		0			
MI	18	5.55	46.1	8.298	9	51.3	9.234	9	2.0		0			
MN	10	10.0	45.5	4.55	5	47.9	4.79	5	5.2		0			
MS	7	14.28	57.6	4.032	4	40.7	2.849	3	8.0		0			
MO	11	9.09	50.4	5.544	6	47.1	5.181	5	1.6		0			
MT	3	33.33	58.4	1.752	2	33.4	1.002	1	6.0		0			
NB	5	20.0	58.0	2.9	3	37.2	1.86	2	3.4		0			
NV	4	25.0	49.5	1.98	2	46.0	1.84	2	2.5		0			
NH	4	25.0	48.1	1.924	2	46.8	1.872	2	3.9		0			
NJ	15	6.66	40.3	6.045	6	56.1	8.415	9	3.0		0			

	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 2000 Presidential Election													
	State		Geo	rge W. B	ush	A	lbert Gor	e	Ra	lph Nad	er			
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
NM	5	20.0	47.85	2.392	2	47.91	2.395	3	3.6		0			
NY	33	3.03	35.2	11.616	12	60.2	19.866	20	3.6	1.188	1			
NC	14	7.14	56.0	7.84	8	43.2	6.048	6						
ND	3	33.33	60.7	default	3	33.0		0	3.3	1	0			
ОН	21	4.76	50.0	10.5	11	46.5	9.765	10	2.5					
OK	8	12.5	60.3	4.8244	5	38.4	3.072	3						
OR	7	14.28	46.5	3.255	3	47.0	3.29	4	5.0		0			
PA	23	4.35	46.4	10.672	11	50.6	11.638	12	2.1	1	0			
RI	4	25.0	31.9	1.276	1	61.0	2.44	3	6.1		0			
SC	8	12.5	56.8	4.544	5	40.9	3.272	3	1.5	1	0			
SD	3	33.33	60.3	1.809	2	37.6	1.128	1	1.1		0			
TN	11	9.09	51.2	5.632	6	47.3	5.203	5	1.0		0			
TX	32	3.125	59.3	18.976	19	38.0	12.16	13	2.2		0			
UT	5	20.0	66.8	3.34	4	26.3	1.315	1	4.7		0			
VT	3	33.33	40.7	1.221	1	50.6	1.518	2	6.9		0			
VA	13	7.69	52.5	6.825	7	44.4	5.772	6	2.2		0			
WA	11	9.09	44.6	4.906	5	50.1	5.511	6	4.1		0			
WV	5	20.0	51.9	2.595	3	45.6	2.28	2	1.7		0			
WI	11	9.09	47.6	5.236	5	47.8	5.258	6	3.6		0			
WY	3	33.33	67.8	default	3	27.7		0	2.1		0			
	538				270				265		3			

Results for Proportional Allocation of Electors for 2000 Election, and change from official results.

George W. Bush Republican	Albert Gore Democrat	Ralph Nader Green	
270 (-1)	265 (-1)	3 (+3)	

• In the District of Columbia, one Gore Elector abstained from voting.

Thus for the 2004 Election, Bush would receive the minimum 270 pledged electors to votes for him to become President in the Electoral College.

	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 1996 Presidential Election													
	State		Bi	ill Clinto	n	Ro	obert Dol	.e	R	oss Pero	t	Ra	ılph Nad	er
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
AL	9	11.11	43.2	3.888	4	50.1	4.509	5	6.0		0			
AK	3	33.33	33.3		0	50.8	default	3	10.9		0	3.14		0
AZ	8	12.5	46.5	3.72	4	44.3	3.544	4	80		0	0.15		0
AR	6	16.66	53.7	3.222	4	36.8	2.208	2	7.9		0	0.41		0
CA	54	1.85	51.1	27.594	28	38.2	20.628	21	7.0	3.78	4	2.4	1.296	1
CO	8	12.5	44.4	3.552	4	45.8	3.664	4	6.6		0	1.7		0
CT	8	12.5	52.8	4.224	5	34.7	2.776	3	10.0		0	1.8		0
DE	3	33.33	51.8	1.554	2	36.5	1.095	1	10.6		0	0.1		0
DC	3	33.33	85.2	default	3	9.3		0	1.9		0	2.3		0
FL	25	4.0	48.0	12.0	12	42.3	10.575	11	9.1	2.275	2	0.1		0
GA	13	7.69	45.8	5.954	6	47.0	6.11	7	6.4		0			
HI	4	25.0	56.9	2.276	3	31.6	1.264	1	7.6		0	2.9		0
ID	4	25.0	33.7	1.348	2	52.2	2.088	2	12.7		0			
IL	22	4.54	54.3	11.946	12	36.8	8.096	8	8.0	1.76	2	0.0		0
IN	12	8.33	41.6	4.992	5	47.1	5.652	6	10.5	1.26	1	0.1		0
IA	7	14.28	50.3	3.521	4	39.9	2.793	3	8.5		0	0.5		0
KS	6	16.66	36.1	2.166	2	54.3	3.258	4	8.6		0	0.1		0
KT	8	12.5	45.8	3.664	4	44.9	3.592	4	8.7		0	0.1		0
LA	9	11.11	52.0	4.68	5	40.0	3.60	4	6.9		0	0.3		0
ME	4	25.0	30.8	1.232	2	51.6	2.064	2	14.2		0	2.5		0
MD	10	10.0	54.3	5.43	6	38.3	3.83	4	6.50		0	0.2		0
MA	12	8.33	61.5	7.38	8	28.1	3.372	3	8.9	1.068	1	0.2		0
MI	18	5.55	51.7	9.306	9	38.5	6.93	7	8.8	1.584	2	0.1		0
MN	10	10.0	51.1	5.11	5	35.0	3.5	4	11.8	1.18	1	1.1		0
MS	7	14.28	44.1	3.087	3	49.2	3.444	4	5.8		0			
MO	11	9.09	47.5	5.225	5	41.2	4.532	5	10.1	1.111	1	0.0		0
MT	3	33.33	41.2	1.236	1	44.1	1.323	2	13.6		0			
NB	5	20.0	35.0	1.75	2	53.6	2.68	3	10.5		0			
NV	4	25.0	43.9	1.756	2	42.9	1.716	2	9.5		0	1.0		0
NH	4	25.0	49.3	1.972	2	39.4	1.576	2	9.7		0			
NJ	15	6.66	53.7	8.055	8	35.9	5.385	6	8.5	1.275	1	1.1		0

	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 1996 Presidential Election													
	State		Bi	ill Clinto	n	Ro	bert Dol	e	Ross Perot			Ralph Nader		
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
NM	5	20.0	49.2	2.46	3	41.9	2.095	2	5.8		0	2.4		0
NY	33	3.03	59.5	19.635	20	30.6	10.098	10	8.0	2.64	3	1.2		0
NC	14	7.14	44.0	6.16	7	48.7	6.818	7	6.7		0	0.1		0
ND	3	33.33	40.1	1.203	1	47.0	1.41	2	12.2		0			
ОН	21	4.76	47.4	9.954	10	41.0	8.61	9	10.7	2.247	2	0.1		0
OK	8	12.5	40.5	3.24	4	48.3	3.864	4	10.8		0			
OR	7	14.28	47.2	3.304	4	39.1	2.737	3	8.8		0	3.6		0
PA	23	4.35	49.2	11.316	12	40.0	9.20	9	9.6	2.208	2	0.1		0
RI	4	25.0	59.7	2.388	3	26.8	1.072	1	11.2		0	1.6		0
SC	8	12.5	43.9	3.512	4	49.9	3.992	4	5.6		0			
SD	3	33.33	43.0	1.29	1	46.5	1.395	2	9.7		0			
TN	11	9.09	48.0	5.28	6	45.6	5.016	5	5.6		0	0.3		0
TX	32	3.125	43.8	14.016	14	48.8	15.616	16	6.8	2.176	2	0.1		0
UT	5	20.0	33.3	1.665	2	54.4	2.72	3	10.0		0	0.7		0
VT	3	33.33	53.4	default	3	31.1		0	12		0	2.2		0
VA	13	7.69	45.2	5.876	6	47.1	6.123	7	6.6		0			
WA	11	9.09	49.8	5.478	6	37.3	4.103	5	8.9		0	2.7		0
WV	5	20.0	51.5	2.575	3	36.8	1.84	2	11.3		0			
WI	11	9.09	48.8	5.368	6	38.5	4.235	4	10.4	1.144	1	1.3		0
WY	3	33.33	36.8	1.104	1	49.8	1.494	2	12.3		0			
	538				278				234		25			1

Results for Proportional Allocation of Electors for 1996 Election, and change from official results.

Bill Clinton	Robert Dole	H. Ross Perot	Ralph Nader
Democrat	Republican	Independent	Green
278 (-101)	234 (+75)	25 (+25)	1 (+1)

Thus for the 1996 Election, Clinton would receive greater than the minimum 270 pledged electors to cast votes for him to become President in the Electoral College.

	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 1992 Presidential Election													
	State		В	ill Clinto	n	Ge	eorge Bus	sh	Н.	Ross Per	ot			
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
AL	9	11.11	40.9	3.68	4	47.6	4.284	5	10.9		0			
AK	3	33.33	30.3		0	39.5	default	3	28.4		0			
AZ	8	12.5	36.5	2.92	3	38.5	3.08	3	23.8	1.904	2			
AR	6	16.66	53.1	3.186	4	35.5	2.13	2	10.4		0			
CA	54	1.85	46.0	24.84	25	32.6	17.604	18	20.6	11.124	11			
CO	8	12.5	40.1	3.208	3	35.9	2.872	3	23.3	1.864	2			
CT	8	12.5	42.2	3.376	3	35.8	2.864	3	21.6	1.728	2			
DE	3	33.33	43.5	1.305	2	35.3	1.059	1	20.4		0			
DC	3	33.33	84.6	default	3	9.1		0	4.3		0			
FL	25	4.0	39.0	9.75	10	40.9	10.225	10	19.8	4.95	5			
GA	13	7.69	43.5	5.655	6	42.9	5.577	5	13.3	1.729	2			
HI	4	25.0	48.1	1.924	2	36.7	1.468	2	14.2		0			
ID	4	25.0	28.4	1.136	1	42.0	1.68	2	27.0	1.08	1			
IL	22	4.54	48.6	10.692	11	34.3	7.546	7	16.6	3.652	4			
IN	12	8.33	36.8	4.416	5	42.9	5.148	5	19.8	2.376	2			
IA	7	14.28	43.3	3.031	3	37.3	2.611	3	18.7	1.31	1			
KS	6	16.66	33.7	2.022	2	38.9	2.33	2	27.0	1.62	2			
KT	8	12.5	44.6	3.568	4	41.3	3.304	3	13.7	1.096	1			
LA	9	11.11	45.6	4.104	4	41.0	3.69	4	11.8	1.062	1			
ME	4	25.0	38.8	1.55	2	30.4	1.216	1	30.4	1.216	1			
MD	10	10.0	49.8	4.95	5	35.6	3.56	4	14.2	1.42	1			
MA	12	8.33	47.5	5.70	6	29.0	3.48	3	22.8	2.736	3			
MI	18	5.55	43.8	7.884	8	36.4	6.552	7	19.3	3.474	3			
MN	10	10.0	43.5	4.35	4	31.9	3.19	3	24.0	2.4	3			
MS	7	14.28	40.8	2.856	3	49.7	3.479	4	8.7		0			
МО	11	9.09	37.6	4.136	4	35.1	3.86	4	26.1	2.871	3			
MT	3	33.33	37.6	1.128	2	35.1	1.053	1	26.1		0			
NB	5	20.0	29.4	1.47	2	46.6	2.33	2	23.6	1.18	1			
NV	4	25.0	37.4	1.496	2	34.7	1.388	1	26.2	1.048	1			
NH	4	25.0	38.9	1.556	2	37.6	1.504	2	22.6		0			
NJ	15	6.66	43.0	6.45	7	40.6	6.09	6	15.6	2.34	2			

	Proportional Allocation of Electors for the 1992 Presidential Election													
	State		Bi	ill Clinto	n	Ge	orge Bus	sh	Н.	Ross Pei	ot			
Name	Elec	ET%	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE	PV%	CE	AE
NM	5	20.0	45.9	2.295	3	37.3	1.865	2	16.1		0			
NY	33	3.03	49.7	16.401	17	33.9	11.187	11	15.8	5.214	5			
NC	14	7.14	42.6	5.964	6	43.4	6.076	6	13.7	1.918	2			
ND	3	33.33	32.2		0	44.2	default	3	23.1		0			
ОН	21	4.76	40.2	8.442	9	38.4	8.064	8	21.0	4.41	4			
OK	8	12.5	34.0	2.72	3	42.7	3.416	3	23.0	1.84	2			
OR	7	14.28	42.5	2.975	3	32.5	2.275	2	24.2	1.694	2			
PA	23	4.35	45.2	10.396	11	36.1	8.303	8	18.2	4.186	4			
RI	4	25.0	47.0	1.88	2	29.0	1.16	2	23.2		0			
SC	8	12.5	39.9	3.192	4	48.0	3.84	4	11.6		0			
SD	3	33.33	37.1	1.113	1	40.7	1.221	2	21.8		0			
TN	11	9.09	47.1	5.181	5	42.4	4.664	5	10.1	1.11	1			
TX	32	3.125	37.1	11.872	12	40.6	12.992	13	22.0	7.04	7			
UT	5	20.0	24.6	1.33	1	43.4	2.17	2	27.3,	1.365	2			
VT	3	33.33	46.1	default	3	30.4		0	22.8		0			
VA	13	7.69	40.6	5.278	5	45.0	5.85	6	13.6	1.768	2			
WA	11	9.09	43.4	4.447	4	32.0	3.52	4	23.7	2.607	3			
WV	5	20.0	48.4	2.42	3	35.4	1.77	2	15.9		0			
WI	11	9.09	41.1	4.521	5	36.8	4.048	4	21.5	2.365	2			
WY	3	33.33	34.0	1.02	1	39.6	1.188	2	25.6		0			
	538				240			208			90			

Results for Proportional Allocation of Electors for 1992 Election, and change from official results.

Bill Clinton Democrat	George Bush Republican	H. Ross Perot Independent	
240 (-130)	208 (+40)	90 (+90)	

Thus for the 1992 Election, no candidate receives a majority (270) of pledged electors to cast votes for them in the Electoral College. If no candidate received the votes of the majority of electors (270+) then pursuant to Article 2, Section 1, and 12th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution [5], the U.S. House of Representatives would vote to select the President, which occurred for the Elections of 1800 and 1824.