

Refutation of Leibniz' identity of indiscernibles and Leo-III theorem prover

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Abstract: Leibniz' identity of indiscernibles as $\forall x \forall y [\forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow x=y]$ is *not* tautologous. Consequently the Leo-III theorem prover for higher-order paramodulated extensional logic is also refuted. These form a *non* tautologous fragment of the universal logic VL4.

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 with Tautology as the designated proof value, **F** as contradiction, **N** as truthity (non-contingency), and **C** as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables, sometimes with table counts, for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET \sim Not, \neg ; + Or, \vee, \cup, \sqcup ; - Not Or; & And, $\wedge, \cap, \square, \cdot, \otimes$; \ Not And;
> Imply, greater than, $\rightarrow, \Rightarrow, \mapsto, >, \supset, \rightarrow$; < Not Imply, less than, $\in, <, \subset, \neq, \neq, \ll, \lesssim$;
= Equivalent, $\equiv, :=, \Leftrightarrow, \leftrightarrow, \triangleq, \approx, \simeq$; @ Not Equivalent, \neq, \oplus ;
% possibility, for one or some, \exists, \diamond, M ; # necessity, for every or all, \forall, \square, L ;
(z=z) **T** as tautology, **T**, ordinal 3; (z@z) **F** as contradiction, $\emptyset, \text{Null}, \perp$, zero;
(%z>#z) **N** as non-contingency, Δ , ordinal 1; (%z<#z) **C** as contingency, ∇ , ordinal 2;
 $\sim(y < x)$ ($x \leq y$), ($x \subseteq y$), ($x \sqsubseteq y$); (A=B) (A~B).
Note for clarity, we usually distribute quantifiers onto each designated variable.

From: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles

Identity of indiscernible

For any x and y, if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y:

$$\forall x \forall y [\forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow x=y] \quad (2.1)$$

LET p, q, r: F, x, y.

$$((\#p\&\#q)=(\#p\&\#r))>(\#q=\#r); \quad \text{TTCT CTTT TTCT CTTT} \quad (2.2)$$

From: Steen, A.; Benzmüller, C. (2019). Extensional higher-order paramodulation in Leo-III. arxiv.org/pdf/1907.11501.pdf

Abstract: Leo-III is an automated theorem prover for extensional type theory with Henkin semantics and choice. Reasoning with primitive equality is enabled by adapting paramodulation-based proof search to higher-order logic.

3 Extensional higher-order paramodulation

[Fn 4] The Identity of Indiscernibles (also known as Leibniz's law) refers to a principle first formulated by Gottfried Leibniz in the context of theoretical philosophy.. The principle states that if two objects X and Y coincide on every property P, then they are equal, i.e. $\forall X_{\tau}. \forall Y_{\tau}. (\forall P_{\sigma}. PX \leftrightarrow PY) \Rightarrow X=Y$, where “=” denotes the desired equality predicate. Since this principle can easily be formulated in HOL, it is possible to encode equality in higher-order logic without using the primitive equality predicate.

Remark: Eq. 2.2 as rendered is not tautologous, hence refuting Leibniz' identity of indiscernibles, it also refutes the conjecture as title above, including the Leo-III theorem prover for extensional logic.