

## Refutation of a 'concrete' Rauszer Boolean algebra generated by a preorder

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**Abstract:** From the 11 equations tested, we refute 13 artifacts:

1. a condition for "an existential quantifier  $\exists \dots$  on a Boolean algebra";
2. "a quantifier  $\exists$  as closure operator on B, for which every open element is closed";
3. the interior operator on abstract topological Boolean algebra;
4. the kernel of a homomorphism from a Heyting algebra into another as a filter;
5. deductive systems and filters as equivalent;
6. the atomic definition of  $p \leq \exists p$  in Halmos algebra;
7. a 'concrete' Rauszer Boolean algebra;
8. two conditions for the definition of a filter (and Heyting algebra using the filter);
9. a De Morgan algebra as a Kleene algebra;
10. equivalences of symmetrical Heyting algebras;
11. equivalences in Heyting algebras;
12. intuitionistic implication of intuitionistic logic; and
13. a theorem and a proposition of Nelson algebras.

As a result, the following seven areas are *non* tautologous fragments of the universal logic  $\forall\exists\forall$ :

1. Topological Boolean algebra;
2. Heyting algebra;
3. Intuitionistic logic;
4. Halmos algebra;
5. Rauszer algebra;
6. Kleene algebra; and
7. Nelson algebra.

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/ $\forall\exists\forall$  with Tautology as the designated proof value, **F** as contradiction, **N** as truthity (non-contingency), and **C** as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables, sometimes with table counts, for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET  $\sim$  Not,  $\neg$ ;  $+$  Or,  $\vee$ ,  $\cup$ ,  $\sqcup$ ;  $-$  Not Or;  $\&$  And,  $\wedge$ ,  $\cap$ ,  $\sqcap$ ,  $;$ ;  $\setminus$  Not And;  
> Imply, greater than,  $\rightarrow$ ,  $\Rightarrow$ ,  $\mapsto$ ,  $>$ ,  $\supset$ ,  $\Rightarrow$ ; < Not Imply, less than,  $\in$ ,  $<$ ,  $\subset$ ,  $\neq$ ,  $\neq$ ,  $\ll$ ,  $\lesssim$ ;  
= Equivalent,  $\equiv$ ,  $:=$ ,  $\Leftrightarrow$ ,  $\leftrightarrow$ ,  $\hat{=}$ ,  $\approx$ ,  $\simeq$ ; @ Not Equivalent,  $\neq$ ;  
% possibility, for one or some,  $\exists$ ,  $\diamond$ , **M**; # necessity, for every or all,  $\forall$ ,  $\square$ , **L**;  
(z=z) **T** as tautology, **T**, ordinal 3; (z@z) **F** as contradiction,  $\emptyset$ , Null,  $\perp$ , zero;  
(%z>#z) **N** as non-contingency,  $\Delta$ , ordinal 1; (%z<#z) **C** as contingency,  $\nabla$ , ordinal 2;  
 $\sim(y < x)$  ( $x \leq y$ ), ( $x \subseteq y$ ), ( $x \sqsubseteq y$ ); (A=B) (A~B).  
Note for clarity, we usually distribute quantifiers onto each designated variable.

From: Iturrioz, L. (2019). About a 'concrete' Rauszer Boolean algebra generated by a preorder.  
[arxiv.org/pdf/1905.09928.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.09928.pdf) [luisa.iturrioz@math.univ-lyon1.fr](mailto:luisa.iturrioz@math.univ-lyon1.fr)

(page 2) Recall that [...] an existential quantifier  $\exists \dots$  on a Boolean algebra  $(B, \wedge, \vee, -, 0, 1)$  is a mapping  $\exists : B \rightarrow B$  satisfying the following conditions:

$$(\exists 0) \exists 0 = 0 \tag{0.1.1}$$

LET  $p, q: a, b; (p=p) 1 \text{ or } \mathbf{T}; (p@p) 0 \text{ or } \mathbf{F}.$

$$\%(p@p)=(p@p); \quad \text{NNNN NNNN NNNN NNNN} \tag{0.1.2}$$

**Remark 0.1.2:** Eq. 0.1.2 is not tautologous, thereby refuting a condition for "an existential quantifier  $\exists \dots$  on a Boolean algebra".

$$(\exists 1) a \wedge \exists a = a \tag{1.1.1}$$

**Remark 1.1.1:** Eq. 1.1.1 as a tautology seems to be another misstatement in the literature of the Halmos algebra. For example the equivalent as (Q<sub>2</sub>):

From: Halmos, P.R. (1954). Algebraic logic, I. Monadic boolean algebras. *Compositio Mathematica*, tome 2 (1954-1956). 217-249. [numdam.org/article/CM\\_1954-1956\\_\\_12\\_\\_217\\_0.pdf](http://numdam.org/article/CM_1954-1956__12__217_0.pdf) [image]

$$(Q_2) \quad p \leq \exists p, \text{ page 4} \tag{Q2.1}$$

$$\sim(\%p<p) = (p=p); \quad \text{NTNT NTNT NTNT NTNT} \tag{Q2.2}$$

**Remark Q2.2:** Eq. Q2.2 as rendered refutes the Halmos algebra at its most atomic level.

[T]he image  $\exists(B)$  (i.e. the range of the quantifier  $\exists$ ), is a monadic Boolean subalgebra of  $B$ . In addition,  $x \in \exists(B)$  if and only if  $\exists x=x$ , if and only if  $\forall x=x$ . (2.1)

LET  $p, q: a, B$

$$((\#p=p)>(\%p=p))>(p<\%q); \quad \text{CNC\mathbf{F} CNC\mathbf{F} CNC\mathbf{F} CNC\mathbf{F}} \tag{2.2}$$

An element  $x$  such that  $\exists x = x$  (resp.  $\forall x = x$ ) is called closed (resp. open), constant or a fixpoint, and the set of closed elements is the same as the set of open elements [...]. In other words, a quantifier  $\exists$  is a closure operator on  $B$ , for which every open element is closed.

**Remark 2.2:** Eq. 2.2 is not tautologous, refuting "a quantifier  $\exists$  is a closure operator on  $B$ , for which every open element is closed".

## 2. A 'concrete' Rauszer Boolean algebra

[B]ased on semisimplicity motivations, A. Monteiro [...], has studied properties of several binary operations in abstract topological Boolean algebras  $(A, I)$ , where  $A$  is a Boolean algebra and  $I$  is an interior operator on  $A$ . In particular, he dealt with an implication  $\Rightarrow$  [...], [where  $\supset$  is the classical implication  $x \supset y = \neg x \cup y$ ] defined by:

$$a \Rightarrow b = I(Ia \supset Ib) \tag{2.3.1}$$

$$(p>q)=(r\&((r\&p)>(r\&q))); \quad \mathbf{FTFF} \text{ TTTT } \mathbf{FTFF} \text{ TTTT} \tag{2.3.2}$$

**Remark 2.3.2:** Eq. 2.3.2 is *not* tautologous, and so refutes the interior operator on abstract topological Boolean algebra.

### 3. Representation theorems in an unified form

For the sake of clarity we recall that a subset  $F$  of a lattice  $(A, \wedge, \vee, 0, 1)$  is said to be a filter if the following conditions are satisfied:

$$(f1) 1 \in F ; \tag{3.1.1.1}$$

$$\text{LET } p, q, r, s, t \in P, Q, a, b, A, F; \quad (p=p) 1 \text{ or } \top .$$

$$(p=p) < t ; \quad \begin{array}{cccc} \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT}, \\ \text{FFFF} & \text{FFFF} & \text{FFFF} & \text{FFFF} \end{array} \tag{3.1.1.2}$$

$$(f2) \text{ if } a, b \in F , \text{ then } a \wedge b \in F ; \tag{3.1.2.1}$$

**Remark 3.2.1:** Eq. 3.2.1 is a trivial tautology.

$$(f3) \text{ if } a \in F \text{ and } a \leq b, \text{ then } b \in F ; \tag{3.1.3.1}$$

$$((r < t) \& \sim (s < r)) > (s < t) ; \quad \begin{array}{cccc} \text{TTTT} & \text{FFFF} & \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT}, \\ \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} \end{array} \tag{3.1.3.2}$$

We note, incidentally, that for Heyting algebras, the kernel of a homomorphism from a Heyting algebra into another, is a filter. Also, the notions of deductive systems and filters are equivalent (A. Monteiro, 1959).

**Remark 3:** Two conditions for a filter are not tautologous, thereby refuting the definition of a filter and Heyting algebra which uses the filter.

### B) Representation of symmetrical Heyting algebras

A De Morgan algebra  $A$  [is a Kleene algebra for]

$$(K_{a,b}) a \wedge \sim a \leq b \vee \sim b, \text{ for any } a, b \in A \text{ holds} \tag{3.2.1}$$

$$(\#(r \& s) < t) > \sim ((s + \sim s) < (r \& \sim r)) ; \quad \begin{array}{cccc} \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} & \text{CCCC}, \\ \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} & \text{TTTT} \end{array} \tag{3.2.2}$$

**Remark 3.2.2:** Eq. 3.2.2 is not tautologous, thereby refuting a De Morgan algebra as a Kleene algebra.

### Definition 3.4

[T]he following equivalences on account of the intuitionistic equality  $x \wedge (x \Rightarrow y) = x \wedge y$  [...]:

$$\tag{3.4.1.1}$$

$$\text{LET } p, q: x, y$$

$$(p \& (p > q)) = (p + q) ; \quad \text{TFFT TFFT TFFT TFFT} \quad (3.4.1.2)$$

**Remark 3.4.1.2:** Eq. 3.4.1.2 is *not* tautologous, thereby refuting the intuitionistic equality as claimed.

**Theorem 3.5 Proof:** equivalences

$$P \in h(\sim x) \Leftrightarrow \sim x \in P \Leftrightarrow x \in \sim P \Leftrightarrow x \notin (\sim P) = \phi(P) \Leftrightarrow \phi(P) \notin h(x) \Leftrightarrow P \notin \phi(h(x)) \Leftrightarrow P \in \sim \phi(h(x)) = \sim h(x). \quad (3.5.1)$$

LET p, q, r, s: P, h, x,  $\phi$

$$(((p < (q \& \sim r)) = ((\sim r < p) = (r < \sim p))) = (\sim(r < \sim(\sim p = (s \& p)))) = \sim((s \& p) < (q \& r))) = ((\sim(p < (s \& (q \& r)))) = (p < (\sim s \& (q \& r)))) = (\sim q \& r) ; \quad \text{TTFE TFFF TFFT TFFT} \quad (3.5.2)$$

**Remark 3.5.2:** Eq. 3.5.2 is not tautologous, thereby refuting equivalences of symmetrical Heyting algebras.

### C) Representation of Nelson algebras

**Theorem 3.8 Proof:**

$$[(a \wedge b) \Rightarrow (\sim a \vee \sim b \vee c)] \leq a \Rightarrow [\sim a \vee (b \Rightarrow (\sim b \vee c))] \quad (3.8.1.1)$$

$$\sim(p < ((p \& q) > (\sim p + (\sim q + r)))) > (\sim p + (q > (\sim q + r))) ; \quad (3.8.1.2)$$

By the definition of the intuitionistic implication this is equivalent to

$$a \wedge [(a \wedge b) \Rightarrow (\sim a \vee \sim b \vee c)] \leq \sim a \vee [b \Rightarrow (\sim b \vee c)] \quad (3.8.2.1)$$

$$\sim((\sim p + (q > (\sim q + r))) < (p \& ((p \& q) > (\sim p + (\sim q + r)))))) = (p = p)$$

$$\text{Remark 3.8: Eqs 3.8.1.1} = 3.8.2.1 \quad (3.8.3.1)$$

$$(\sim(p < ((p \& q) > (\sim p + (\sim q + r)))) > (\sim p + (q > (\sim q + r)))) = \sim((\sim p + (q > (\sim q + r))) < (p \& ((p \& q) > (\sim p + (\sim q + r)))))) ; \quad \text{FTFT FTFT FTFT FTFT} \quad (3.8.3.2)$$

Eq. 3.8.3.2 is *not* tautologous as claimed, hence refuting Theorem 3.8 as a representation of Nelson algebras.

### Proposition 3.9

LET p, q, r: G, H, K

$$(G \cap H) \Rightarrow (\sim G \cup \sim H \cup K) \subseteq G \Rightarrow (\sim G \cup (H \Rightarrow (\sim H \cup K))) \quad (3.9.1.1)$$

$$(p \& q) > (\sim(p < (\sim p + (\sim q + r)))) > (\sim p + (q > (\sim q + r))) ; \quad (3.9.1.2)$$

By the definition of the intuitionistic implication this is equivalent to

$$G \cap [(G \cap H) \Rightarrow (\sim G \cup \sim H \cup K)] \subseteq \sim G \cup (H \Rightarrow (\sim H \cup K)) \quad (3.9.2.1)$$

$$\sim((\sim p+(q>(\sim q+r)))<(p\&((p\&q)>(\sim p+(\sim q+r)))))) = (p=p) ; \quad (3.9.2.2)$$

**Remark 3.9:** Eqs 3.8.1.1 = 3.8.2.1 (3.9.3.1)

$$\begin{aligned} &((p\&q)>(\sim(p<(\sim p+(\sim q+r)))>(\sim p+(q>(\sim q+r))))))= \\ &\sim((\sim p+(q>(\sim q+r)))<(p\&((p\&q)>(\sim p+(\sim q+r)))))) ; \\ &\qquad\qquad\qquad \mathbf{FTFT \ FTFT \ FTFT \ FTFT} \end{aligned} \quad (3.9.3.2)$$

Eq. 3.9.3.2 is *not* tautologous as claimed, hence refuting a proposition of Nelson algebras.

From the 11 equations tested, we refute 13 artifacts:

1. a condition for "an existential quantifier  $\exists \dots$  on a Boolean algebra";
2. "a quantifier  $\exists$  as closure operator on B, for which every open element is closed";
3. the interior operator on abstract topological Boolean algebra;
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13. a theorem and a proposition of Nelson algebras.

As a result, the following are seven fields are *non* tautologous fragments of universal logic VŁ4: topological Boolean algebra; Heyting algebra; intuitionistic logic; Halmos algebra; Rauszer algebra; Kleene algebra; and Nelson algebra.