

## Refutation of collection theory as the set of universal closure of sentences

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**Abstract:** We evaluate collection theory as the set of universal closure of sentences in a schema equation. It is *not* tautologous. This refutes Collection as the conjectured schema. Therefore collection theory is a *non* tautologous fragment of the universal logic  $\forall\exists\Delta$ .

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/ $\forall\exists\Delta$  with Tautology as the designated proof value, **F** as contradiction, N as truthity (non-contingency), and C as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables, sometimes with table counts, for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET  $\sim$  Not,  $\neg$ ; + Or,  $\vee$ ,  $\cup$ ,  $\sqcup$ ; - Not Or; & And,  $\wedge$ ,  $\cap$ ,  $\square$ ,  $\cdot$ ; \ Not And;  
 > Imply, greater than,  $\rightarrow$ ,  $\Rightarrow$ ,  $\mapsto$ ,  $>$ ,  $\supset$ ,  $\succ$ ;  
 < Not Imply, less than,  $\in$ ,  $<$ ,  $\subset$ ,  $\prec$ ,  $\neq$ ,  $\ll$ ,  $\lesssim$ ;  
 = Equivalent,  $\equiv$ ,  $:=$ ,  $\Leftrightarrow$ ,  $\leftrightarrow$ ,  $\triangleq$ ,  $\approx$ ,  $\cong$ ; @ Not Equivalent,  $\neq$ ;  
 % possibility, for one or some,  $\exists$ ,  $\diamond$ , M; # necessity, for every or all,  $\forall$ ,  $\square$ , L;  
 (z=z) T as tautology,  $\top$ , ordinal 3; (z@z) **F** as contradiction,  $\emptyset$ , Null,  $\perp$ , zero;  
 (%z>#z) N as non-contingency,  $\Delta$ , ordinal 1;  
 (%z<#z) C as contingency,  $\nabla$ , ordinal 2;  
 $\sim(y < x)$  ( $x \leq y$ ), ( $x \subseteq y$ ); (A=B) (A~B); (B>A) (A+B); (B>A) (A#B).  
 Note for clarity, we usually distribute quantifiers onto each designated variable.

From: Quinsey, J.E. (1980). Applications of Kripke's notion of fulfilment. Dissertation. St. Catherine's College, Oxon. [arxiv.org/pdf/1904.10540.pdf](http://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.10540.pdf) [jquinsey@i2msystems.com](mailto:jquinsey@i2msystems.com)

When we say, for example, that Collection is the schema

$$\forall x \in a \exists y \theta \supset \exists b \forall x \in a \exists y \in b \theta, \quad (1.1)$$

we mean that Collection is the set of universal closure of sentences of this form, where  $\theta$  ranges over all formulae of the language under consideration, and where suitable precautions are taken to avoid collision of variables. A *theory* is a set of sentences.

LET  $p, q, x, y, t: a, b, x, y, \theta$ .

$$\begin{aligned} & (\#x < (p \& (\%y \& t))) > ((\%q \& \#x) < ((p \& \%y) < (q \& t))) ; \\ & \text{TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (16), CCTT CCTT CCTT CCTT (16),} \\ & \text{TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (16),} \\ & \text{CCTC CCTC CCTC CCTC, CTTT CTTT CTTT CTTT} \} \times 8 = (16) \end{aligned} \quad (1.2)$$

Eq. 1.2 as rendered is not tautologous. This refutes Collection as the conjectured schema.