The problem with Leibniz' ontological proof of the existence of God was in not defining "most perfect" from "perfect", and then repeating that definition throughout the arguments.

Assuming the Meth8 apparatus for system variant VL4:

\[
\text{LET: } \ p \ \text{God; } \% \ \text{possibility, existential quantifier;} \ \# \ \text{necessity, universal quantifier;}
\]
\[
> \ \text{Imply; } = \ \text{Equivalent to;} \ (p=p) \ \text{True, perfect;} \ #(p=p) \ \text{most perfect;} \ T \ \text{Tautology.}
\]

The equivalence of the respective quantifiers and modal operators was established in our updated Square of Opposition and corrections to syllogisms Modus Camestros and Modus Cesare elsewhere.

The result fragment is the repeating row of four values from the truth table of 16 values.

We test these sentences as antecedent (1), consequent (2), and proposition (3, 4).

The possibility exists of God as most perfect. \hspace{1cm} (1.1)
\[
%( p> #(p=p)) ; \hspace{1cm} TTTT ; \hspace{1cm} (1.2)
\]

Necessarily God exists as most perfect. \hspace{1cm} (2.1)
\[
( #p> #(p=p)) ; \hspace{1cm} TTTT ; \hspace{1cm} (2.2)
\]

It the possibility exists of God as most perfect, then necessarily God exists as most perfect. \hspace{1cm} (3.1)
\[
%( p>(p=p)) > ( #p> #(p=p)) ; \hspace{1cm} TTTT ; \hspace{1cm} (3.2)
\]

Eq 1.1 can be diluted by using "perfect" instead of "most perfect" in antecedent and consequent. The reason is that perfect is its own superlative, meaning "most perfect" is redundant as something "most perfectly perfect"

It the possibility exists of God as perfect, then necessarily God exists as perfect. \hspace{1cm} (4.1)
\[
%( p> (p=p)) > ( #p> (p=p)) ; \hspace{1cm} TTTT ; \hspace{1cm} (4.2)
\]

The advantage of this proof over that of Karl Popper is that the quality of perfection includes truthfulness and morality. This means that invoking the moral imperative (the existentialist uttering "I ought to ...") to show conscience is not needed to demonstrate that God is a moral being.