

# Shorter refutation of the Löb theorem and Gödel incompleteness by substitution of contradiction

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**Abstract:** Löb's theorem  $\Box(\Box X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow \Box X$  and Gödel's incompleteness as  $\Box(\Box \perp \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow \Box \perp$  are refuted.

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 with Tautology as the designated *proof* value, **F** as contradiction, **N** as truthity (non-contingency), and **C** as falsity (contingency). Results are a 16-valued truth table in row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET  $p, q: X; > \text{ImPLY}, \rightarrow; @ \text{ Not Equivalent}; \# \text{ necessity}, \Box; (p@p) \text{ F as contradiction}, \perp.$

From: Gross, J. et al. (2016). Löb's Theorem. [jasongross.github.io/lob-paper/nightly/lob.pdf](https://jasongross.github.io/lob-paper/nightly/lob.pdf)  
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This, in a nutshell, is Löb's theorem: to prove  $X$ , it suffices to prove that  $X$  is true whenever  $X$  is provable. If we let  $\Box X$  denote the assertion " $X$  is provable," then, symbolically, Löb's theorem becomes:

$$\Box(\Box X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow \Box X. \tag{1.1}$$

$$\#(\#p>p)>\#p ; \qquad \text{CTCT CTCT CTCT CTCT} \tag{1.2}$$

**Remark 1.2:** Eq 1.2 as rendered is *not* tautologous, thus refuting Löb's theorem.

Note that Gödel's incompleteness theorem follows trivially from Löb's theorem: by instantiating  $X$  with a contradiction  $[\perp]$ , we can see that it's impossible for provability to imply truth for propositions which are not already true. (2.1)

$$\#(\#(p@p)>(p@p))>\#(p@p) ; \qquad \text{CCCC CCCC CCCC CCCC} \tag{2.2}$$

**Remark 2.2:** Eq. 2.2, rendered as Eq. 1.2 with  $p$  substituted by  $(p@p)$ , is *not* tautologous but consistently falsity as **C** for contingency. Hence Gödel's incompleteness theorem, as following trivially, is also refuted.

This means that the type of Löb's theorem becomes either  $\Box(\Box X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow \Box X$  [Eq. 1.1], which is not strictly positive, or

$$\Box(X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow \Box X, \tag{3.1}$$

$$\#(p>p)>\#p ; \qquad \text{CTCT CTCT CTCT CTCT} \tag{3.2}$$

which, on interpretation, must be filled with a general fixpoint operator. Such an operator is well-known to be inconsistent.

**Remark Fn. 2:** Eq. 3.2 as rendered produces the same truth table result as Eq. 1.2 and as another trivial refutation.