Refutation that "it is impossible for humans to implement moral absolutism"

Copyright © 2008, 2018 by Colin James III  All rights reserved.

From http://vixra.org/abs/1806.0194 [excluding the examples]

Suppose there is an absolute moral proposition defined with \( X \) number of words and a real-life moral quandary defined with \( Y \) number of words, and that one wants to rely on moral absolutism to make a judgment of morality regarding the quandary ...

\[
(1.1.0)
\]

if the quandary is completely specified by the \( Y \) words.

\[
(1.2.0)
\]

Without absolutely specifying the quandary, one has no way to compare it to the absolute proposition.

Therefore, in all cases, when humans attempt to implement moral absolutism, they will actually implement moral relativity when they decide, relative to their own personal standard of sufficiency, that they have considered enough of the context of the quandary such that it can be compared to the absolute proposition.

\[
(2.0)
\]

Therefore, it is impossible for humans to implement moral absolutism.

\[
(3.0)
\]

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VŁ4 with \( \varepsilon \)autology as the designated \textit{proof} value, \( \varepsilon \) as contradiction, \( \varepsilon \) as truthtiy (non-contingency), and \( \varepsilon \) as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{LET } & p, q, r: \text{ absolute moral proposition, relative moral proposition, word number}; \\
& \sim \text{ Not}; + \text{ Or}; \ - \text{ Not Or}; > \text{ Imply, greater than}; < \text{ Not Imply, less than}; \\
& = \text{ Equivalent}; \ % \text{ possibility, for one or some}; \ # \text{ necessity, for all or every}; \\
& (s=s) \text{ absolute truth}; \ (%s>\#s) \text{ ordinal one}; \ (%s<\#s) \text{ ordinal two}.
\end{align*}
\]

We rewrite Eq. 1.0 to exclude the \textit{a priori} notion of quandary as an \textit{inexact} contradiction to mean an absolute moral proposition defined with \( X \) number of words and a different, non-moral or relative proposition defined with \( Y \) number of words, as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{possibly a word number implies a proposition which is morally absolute as true} \\
\text{(absolute morality)} \\
(\%r> p)>(s=s); \ & \text{TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT}\ \\
\text{and [sic, should be or]} \\
\text{possibly a word number implies not a proposition which is not morally absolute as} \\
\text{not true (relative morality)} \\
(\%r>\neg p)>\neg(s=s); \ & \text{FCFC FTFT FCFC FTFT} \ \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{With Eqs. 1.1.1 and 1.2.1 as:} \\
(\%r> p)>(s=s) \& (\%r>\neg p)>\neg(s=s); \ & \text{FCFC FTFT FCFC FTFT} \ \\
\end{align*}
\]

We rewrite Eq. 2.0 to include the number of words to needed (necessary) to specify fully the \( Y \) words and to include the correction of an Or replacement connective in the consequent:
the last word number, instant word number, or next two word numbers are never
(necessarily not) sufficient to describe (do not imply) a proposition which is morally
absolute as true (absolute morality) or a proposition which is not morally absolute as
not true (relative morality)

\[(2.1)\]

Eq. 2.2 as rendered means Eq. 3.0 (it is impossible for humans to implement moral absolutism) is not
tautologous (not a theorem), but rather a contradiction, and hence refuted.

What follows is confirmation that "It is possible for humans to implement moral absolutism".