Refutation of the paradox of Epimenides the Cretan

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We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VŁ4 with $\tau$autology as the designated proof value, $\mathbb{F}$ as contradiction, $\mathbb{N}$ as truthity (non-contingency), and $\mathbb{C}$ as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table fragment ) is row-major and horizontal.

LET p q s: Epimenides, Cretan, statement;
   ~ Not;  & And;  + Or;  = Equivalent;  @ Not Equivalent;  > Imply, greater than;
   # necessity, for all;  lie (s@s).

From: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epimenides_paradox

"Epimenides the Cretan said that all Cretans were liars, and
all other statements made by Cretans were certainly lies. Was this a lie?" (1.1)

\[(p=q)>(s=(#q>(s@s))) & ((q>\neg(s=(#q>(s@s)))=(s=s)))>(s@s))\] ;
   FFTN FFTN FFCC FFCC (1.2)

Eq. 1.2 as rendered is not tautologous and not contradictory. Therefore the paradox of Epimenides is refuted as a paradox. The answer to the question "Was this a lie" is neither contradiction nor proof.