Refutation of the paradox of Moses Maimonides

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We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VŁ4 with Łautology as the designated proof value, F as contradiction, N as truthity (non-contingency), and C as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table fragment ) is row-major and horizontal.

LET   p q: God, man;
   ~ Not; & And; + Or; = Equivalent; @ Not Equivalent;
   > Imply, greater than; < Not Imply, less than; # necessity, for all;
   (%p>#p) good; (%p<#p) bad; (p@p) imperfect, a lie.

From: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_free_will

Moses Maimonides formulated an argument regarding a person's free will, in traditional terms of good and evil actions, as follows:

Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad?
(p>(q>(%p>#p)))+(p>(q>(%p<#p))) ;
                              TTTT  TTTT  TTTT  TTTT  (1.2)

If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that the man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act,
(p>(q>(%p>#p)))>(q>(p>(q>(%p>#p)))) ;
                              NNNT  NNNT  NNNT  NNNT  (2.2)

otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect ...  
[ < ] p=(p@p) ;
                              TFTF  TFTF  TFTF  TFTF  (3.2)

If Eq. 1.2, then if Eq. 2.1 then Eq. 3.1.

(((p>(q>(%p>#p)))+(p>(q>(%p<#p))))>
  ((p>(q>(%p>#p)))->(q>(p>(q>(%p>#p)))))) < (p=(p@p)) ;
                                      FNFT  FNFT  FNFT  FNFT  (4.2)

As rendered, Eq. 1.2 is tautologous, not contradictory, and a theorem. Eqs. 2.2 and 3.2 are not tautologous and not contradictory. Eq. 4.2, the further embellishment of Eqs. 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2 is not tautologous and not contradictory. Therefore the paradox of Maimonides is refuted as a paradox.