

## Refutation of the paradox of Moses Maimonides

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We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 with Tautology as the designated *proof* value, F as contradiction, N as truthity (non-contingency), and C as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table fragment ) is row-major and horizontal.

LET p q: God, man;  
 ~ Not; & And; + Or; = Equivalent; @ Not Equivalent;  
 > Imply, greater than; < Not Imply, less than; # necessity, for all;  
 (%p>#p) good; (%p<#p) bad; (p@p) imperfect, a lie.

From: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument\_from\_free\_will

Moses Maimonides formulated an argument regarding a person's free will, in traditional terms of good and evil actions, as follows:

Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? (1.1)

$(p > (q > (\%p > \#p))) + (p > (q > (\%p < \#p)))$  ; TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (1.2)

If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that the man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, (2.1)

$(p > (q > (\%p > \#p))) > \#(q > (p > (q > (\%p > \#p))))$  ; NNNT NNNT NNNT NNNT (2.2)

otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect ... (3.1)

[ < ]  $p = (p @ p)$  ; TFTF TFTF TFTF TFTF (3.2)

If Eq. 1.2, then if Eq. 2.1 then Eq. 3.1. (4.1)

$((p > (q > (\%p > \#p))) + (p > (q > (\%p < \#p)))) > ((p > (q > (\%p > \#p))) > \#(q > (p > (q > (\%p > \#p)))) < (p = (p @ p))$  ; FNFT FNFT FNFT FNFT (4.2)

As rendered, Eq. 1.2 is tautologous, *not* contradictory, and a theorem. Eqs. 2.2 and 3.2 are *not* tautologous and *not* contradictory. Eq. 4.2, the further embellishment of Eqs. 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2 is *not* tautologous and *not* contradictory. Therefore the paradox of Maimonides is refuted as a paradox.