We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VŁ4 with Łautology as the designated proof value, \( F \) as contradiction, \( N \) as truthity (non-contingency), and \( C \) as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table fragment is row-major and horizontal.

\[
\text{LET \quad LET } p \; q: \text{God, man;}
\]

\begin{itemize}
  \item \( \sim \) Not; \( \& \) And; \( + \) Or; \( = \) Equivalent; \( @ \) Not Equivalent;
  \item \( \succ \) Imply, greater than; \( \prec \) Not Imply, less than; \( \# \) necessity, for all; lie \( (s@s) \).
  \item \( \langle p\rangle\#p \rangle \) good; \( \langle p\rangle\langle p\rangle \) bad; \( \langle p\rangle\langle p\rangle \) imperfect, a lie.
\end{itemize}

From: [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_free_will](en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_free_will)

Moses Maimonides formulated an argument regarding a person's free will, in traditional terms of good and evil actions, as follows:

Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be
good or bad?

\[
(p\succ(q\succ\langle p\rangle\#p))+(p\succ(q\succ\langle p\rangle\#p)) ;
\]

\[\text{T T T T T T T T} ; \quad \text{T T T T} \]  

(1.1)  

If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that the man is compelled
to act as God knew beforehand he would act,

\[
(p\succ(q\succ\langle p\rangle\#p))\succ(q\succ(p\succ(q\succ\langle p\rangle\#p))) ;
\]

\[\text{T T T T T T T T} ; \quad \text{T T T T} \]  

(2.1)

otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect ...

\[
((p\succ(q\succ\langle p\rangle\#p))\succ(q\succ(p\succ(q\succ\langle p\rangle\#p))))\succ(p\#(p\#p)) ;
\]

\[\text{F T F T} \quad \text{F T F T} \quad \text{F T F T} \quad \text{F T F T} \]

(3.1)

As rendered, Eqs. 1.2 and 2.2 are tautologous, \( \textit{not} \) contradictory, theorems, \( \text{and} \) not paradoxes. Eq. 3.2, the further embellishment of Eq. 2.2, is \( \textit{not} \) tautologous and \( \textit{not} \) contradictory. Therefore the paradox of Maimonides is refuted as a paradox.