Refutation of Hegel's dialectical method

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VŁ4 where tautology is the designated proof value, \( F \) is contradiction, \( N \) is truthity (non-contingency), and \( C \) is falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal. We evaluate the following in one variable of \( p \).


Stage 1:
\[
p \text{ content; } \#p \text{ necessity of content; }
\sim p \text{ determinate negation of content; }
\sim \#p \text{ determinate nothingness of content; }
\>	ext{ Imply, greater than, becomes, becoming; }
\<\text{ Not Imply, less than, sublation}
\]

Stage 2:
\[
\%p \text{ possibility of content, coherence; }
\% (\#p = \#p) \text{ immanence, tautology, proof, }
dialectics as “the principle through which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of science”
\]

Stage 3:
\[
\sim \# \text{ not necessity; }
\%p \text{ some new idea; }
\<\text{ to show up from outside; }
\%p \<\#p \text{ self-sublation; }
"
because the form or determination that arises is the result of the self-sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside." (3.1.1)
(\%p \<\#p) \sim (\# (\%p \<\%p)) = (p = p)) ;
\]

For example:
\[
\%p "\text{somethings};" 
\sim \%p "\text{some other things}, \text{something-others;}
\]

Being-for-itself
\[
(\%p \sim \sim \%p) \& (\sim \%p \rangle \%p) ;
\]

"Being-for-itself embraces the something-others in its content" with a "process of passing back-and-forth between the something-others" (3.3.1)
(\%p \sim \sim \%p) \& (\sim \%p \rangle \%p) \rangle (\sim \%p \sim \sim \%p) \& (\sim \%p \sim \sim \%p) ;
\]

Stage 4:
\[
(\%p \sim \#p) \text{ the finite; }
\# (\%p \sim \#p) \text{ everything finite; }
"\text{everything finite is: its own sublation}" (4.1.1)
\# (\%p \sim \#p) \langle \# (\%p \sim \#p) ;
\# \text{ all;}
\]
Stage 5: "the result of the dialectical process is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite."

Stage 6: the “Absolute” for logic—as an oval that is filled up with and surrounds numerous, embedded rings of smaller ovals and circles, which represent all of the earlier and less universal determinations from the logical development

Hegel’s entire philosophical system ... “presents itself therefore as a circle of circles”

As rendered, Eqs. 3.1.2, 3.3.2, and 6.1.2 are tautologous, but Eqs. 3.2.2, 4.1.2, 4.2.2, 5.1.2, 6.2.2, and 6.3.2 are not tautologous with Eqs. 3.2.2, 4.1.2, and 4.2.2 as contradictions.

In Stage 3, Eq. 3.2.2 the definition of Being-for-itself is a contradiction. Subsequently the main results for Stages 4, 5, and 6 are not tautologous.

We conclude that this refutes Hegel's dialectical method, and in only one variable.