Refutation of the paradox of Epicurus as invoked by Epictetus

We evaluate the captioned by assuming the apparatus and method of Meth8/VŁ4. The designated proof value is T, and F is contradiction. The 16-valued result table is row-major and horizontal.

From: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicurus#Pleasure_as_absence_of_suffering

The "Epicurean paradox" or "Riddle of Epicurus" is a version of the problem of evil.

LET p q r s: God removes; God is willing; God is envious; God is feeble.

God wishes to take away evils [of envy and feebleness], and is unable; (1.1.1)
q&~p ; (1.1.2)

or He is able, and is unwilling; (1.2.1)
p&~q ; (1.2.2)

or He is neither willing nor able, (1.3.1)
~q&~p ; (1.3.2)

or He is both willing and able. (1.4.1)
q&p ; (1.4.2)

If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; (2.1)
(q&~p)>s ; (2.2)

if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; (3.1)
(p&~q)>r ; (3.2)

if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; (4.1)
(~q&~p)>(r&s) ; (4.2)

if He is both willing and able, [He is not envious and not feeble] which alone is suitable to God, (5.1)
(q&p)>(~r&~s) ; (5.2)

if Eq. 5.1, from what source then are evils or why does He not remove them? (6.1)
((q&p)>(~r&~s))>(((r&s)>~(p=p))+~p) ; (6.2)

Eq. 2.1 or Eq.3.1 or Eq. 4.1 or Eq 5.1 (7.1)
((((q&~p)>s)+((p&~q)>r))+((~q&~p)>(r&s))) +
(((q&p)>(~r&~s))>(((r&s)>~(p=p))+~p)) ; TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (7.2)

Eq. 7.2 as rendered is tautologous. This means that the paradox of Epicurus as invoked by Epictetus is refuted as a contradiction, and is confirmed as a theorem and not as a paradox.