

This book is a unique attempt to correlate classical Chinese philosophy with that of Searle (S), whom I regard as the best since Wittgenstein (W) and his intellectual heir. The quality of the articles is unusually high for such a collection, which must be due to Mou's careful selection of papers. Readers will find it instructive to compare this with another recent volume of papers on S's philosophy – "Thinking About the Real World"—another book on which I have written the only review. As with W, everything that S writes is a treasure, but sadly this tome has attracted so little attention that this appears to be the only review, even though it appeared 6 years ago. Its only real deficiency is the failure to print S's reply to Allinson, since it would correct his numerous substantial mistakes. As noted in my other reviews, such mistakes are of interest since they are the universal defaults of our psychology due the fact that our language lacks perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB (Blue and Brown Books) $\frac{3}{4}$ of a century ago. As the conference was taped, I tried to get the video or a transcript of S's reply from Mou, S, Allinson and 3 persons at HKUST but nobody would help.

The issue of spirituality is inevitably mixed in with the language issues of philosophy in some of the papers here. The many subtleties on the road to dispelling the illusion of the ego and the attaining of enlightenment are another issue entirely, although as in all other arenas, philosophical confusions inevitably arise when talking about religion, as opposed to practicing it. That is, philosophy in the broad sense, as musing on ethics, religion, morality, how we ought to live or feel about our life and the world is not the narrower sense in which W and S are practicing it, though inevitably and almost universally the broad sense gets mixed with issues about how language(the mind) works.

As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W's dictum that there are no new discoveries to be made in philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only clear descriptions of behavior (language). Once one understands that all the problems are confusions about how language works, we are at peace and philosophy in his sense has achieved its purpose. As W/S have noted, there is only one reality, so in the narrow sense, there are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the world that can meaningfully be given, and we can only communicate in our one public language. W famously showed that there cannot be a private language and any "private inner" thoughts cannot be communicated and cannot have any role in our social life. It should also be very straightforward to solve philosophical problems in this sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933)

We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior (human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the bedrock or background and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which S calls the logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive psychology of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone's comments on philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which illuminate the use of language. If not, then showing how they have been bewitched by language dispels the confusion. As Horwich has noted on the last page of his superb 'Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy'(see my review) : "What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough."

Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say “describing”) and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes various “theories”, and there is no harm in it, provided one realizes they are comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general idea of how language (the mind) works and that as his “theories” are explicated via examples they become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by any other name...” When there is a question one has to go back to the examples or consider new ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and context sensitive (W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly unlike physics where one can often derive a formula and dispense with the need for further examples. Scientism (the use of scientific language and the causal framework) leads us astray in describing HOT and for me it is essential to keep in mind another of W’s famous comments: “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”(BBB p18). Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided and often demolished scientism, but there is a residue which evinces itself when he remarks in various writings that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W made it abundantly clear that such words are constituted by many language games, which are the innate axiomatic basis of thought, and giving them up or even changing them substantially is not possible. I think the residue of scientism results from the major tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his failure to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went to England to study).

And, as it seems to me critical to understand the difference between the dispositional language games of “explaining” and “understanding”, permit me to quote W again.

“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything,---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!....This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314

“Our method is *purely descriptive*, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” BBB p125

“Every sign [WORD] is capable of interpretation but the *meaning* mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W’s BBB p34

It follows both from W’s 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that ‘will’, ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are axiomatic true-only elements of the reptilian subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes, and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential.

Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to contribute that other students of behavior (i.e., *scientists*) do not, so, noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will

quote from P.M.S Hacker (the leading expert on W) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to scientism.

“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further condition . . . , or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ...What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is *the web of our epistemic concepts*, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.”
(Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s *cul-de-sac*- p15(2005)

Before making detailed remarks on the book, I will first offer some essential comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of S’s PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social World (MSW) and W’s BBB (Blue and Brown Books), PI (Philosophical Investigations), OC(On Certainty), and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in complete detail anywhere that I have seen, that I will refer to as the W/S framework.

To serve as an heuristic, I have generated the following table of INTENTIONALITY, based on a much simpler one from S, which owes much to W, and incorporated data from one that has recently been used by researchers in thinking.

INTENTIONALITY(personality)-the Construction of Social Reality

About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100KYA had evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions that can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s)—i.e., the fast unconscious automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and location) and gradually developed the further ability to encompass displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions , Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, capacities, hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 148). “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) while third person statements about others are true or false (see my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’).

“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing , remembering etc., are often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W

and by Searle (e.g., *Consciousness and Language* p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive System One mental states of perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 and System 3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle's third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 are potential or unconscious mental states (Searle-- *Phil Issues* 1:45-66(1991)).

Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or primary LG's (PLG's --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, no tests possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG's (SLG's --e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I *know* what I believe, think, feel until I act). Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930's) and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, Hacker etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology, contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems framework, and his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) it was further developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table in his classic book *Rationality in Action* (2001). It expands on W's survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work *On Certainty* (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), and in my view the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology), and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG's, in which the mind automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential--Searle)--the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities--described in SLG's-- in which the mind tries to fit the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as SLG's (The Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to working memory and so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions are thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145,p 190).

	(Involuntary Rules R1)				(Voluntary Rules R2)		
	Thinking (Cognition)(No gaps)				Willing (Volition)(3 gaps)		
	Preferences*	Emotions	Memory	Perception	Desires	IAA** +	Actions/Words
Cause Originates From	World	World	World	World	Mind	Mind	Mind
Causes Changes In	None	Mind	Mind	Mind	None	World	World
Causally Self Referential***	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
True or False(Testable)	Yes	T only	T only	T only	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public Conditions of Satisfaction	Yes	Yes/No	No	No	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes
Describe a Mental State	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes/No	Yes
Evolutionary Priority	5	4	2 (3?)	1	5	2	2
Voluntary Content	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Voluntary Initiation	Yes/No	No	Yes	No	Yes/No	Yes	Yes
Cognitive System ****	2	1	1	1	2 / 1	2	2
Change Intensity	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Precise Duration	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Time and Place(H+N or T+T)*****	TT	HN	HN	HN	TT	HN	HN
Special Quality	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Localized in Body	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Bodily Expressions	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Self Contradictions	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Needs a Self	Yes	Yes/No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Needs Language	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes/No
Subliminal Effects	No	Yes/No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes/No
Associative/Rule Based	RB	A/RB	A	A	A/RB	RB	RB
Context Dependent/Abstract	A	CD/A	CD	CD	CD/A	CD/A	CD/A
Serial/Parallel	S	S/P	P	P	S/P	S	S

Heuristic/Analytic	A	H/A	H	H	H/A	A	A
Needs Working Memory	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
General Intelligence Dependent	Yes	No	No	No	Yes/No	Yes	Yes
Cognitive Loading Inhibits	Yes	Yes/No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Arousal Facilitates or Inhibits	I	F/I	F	F	I	I	I

* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Dispositions, Representations etc

** Intention In Action or Prior Intention

*** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills --Itself) Lion is the object, not the cause of fear (W RPP2 148)

**** Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems.

***** Here and Now or There and Then

It should be instructive to compare this table with those used by Hacker in his recent series of 3 volumes "Human Nature."

Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Inclination words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states of S1, or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or might act) and are often incorrectly called "Propositional Attitudes". Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(actual or potential PUBLIC ACTS also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public psychology. Perceptions: ("X" is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature Memories: Remembering, Dreaming.

PREFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS (X might become True) :

CLASS 1: Believing, Judging, Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring , Expecting, Wishing , Wanting, Hoping(a special class), Seeing As (Aspects)

CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-- Dreaming , Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting

CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression . Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger

DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts) : Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, Obligations.

INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True by changing the world to fit my thoughts)

ACTIONS: (I am making “X” True by changing the world to fit my thoughts): Acting, Speaking, Reading, Writing, Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing, Trying, Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising, Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs—these are Public and Voluntary functions of S2 and transfer Information to others so they often dominate over the Private, Involuntary and Informationless reflexes of S1 in explanations of behavior—Searle’s TPI.

ALL WORDS ARE PARTS OF COMPLEX LANGUAGE GAMES (THOUGHTS LEADING TO ACTIONS) HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT (W). The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, fed with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences, which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics.

Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is coextensive in evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes (nature), we can enlarge our understanding by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek(2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by R & L(1999), Spohn, Popper etc.

Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and require consciousness, will and self and in normal human adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness(maximum expected utility). Utility maximization (perhaps Bayesian but this highly contentious) acts via dominance and reciprocal altruism (Desire Independent Reasons for Action-Searle) and impose Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadows back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (i.e., principally of our language games) admits of degrees or kinds (vagueness).

As W noted, inclinations are often experienced as fully conscious and deliberative (TPI). All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts, as they must to be useful. That is, there are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the dispositional verb “thinking”)—nonrational without awareness and rational with partial awareness(transitive and intransitive--W), now described as the fast and slow thinking or “two selves” of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP2 129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, and hence lack “information” even for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) lacks any “internal test” (COS), is not a mental state, and contains no information until it becomes a public act in speech, writing or other muscular contractions (has a COS). “Even if God looked into our minds he could not see our thoughts there” (W). Our (often unconscious) perceptions and memories have potential information (meaning, COS) but only become information carrying (meaningful) when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences, COS). One can summarize this by saying that memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become psychologically effective when they are acted upon.

Developing language means manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts (the contraction of oral muscles in place of or in addition to arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called (UA-Understanding of Agency) –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions. Thus, “propositional attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive rational speech and action. As noted by Hacker, we see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc., by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the BRAIN works), because “mind” is already in full public view. As W noted even God could not read our mind! Any phenomena that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry , genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. But language (almost all our behavior) was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles than I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person expressive use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not descriptive of my mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the usual sense of those words (W). It does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true because it states the public COS. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense are causally self-referential (S1)--they instantiate themselves, but as descriptions of possible states they are not testable (i.e., not T or F). This is a typical case of the inevitable confusion arising from the use the the

same words to describe the mental states of S1 and the dispositions of S2. However past or future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe” contain information that is true or false as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation).

Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by DMS in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 2000). Many uses of words expressing Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-Propositional (NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1 if this phrase is used in its normal sense so they would be unconscious and automatic. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (Emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the “hinges”(W)—i.e., axioms or algorithms of our Evolutionary Psychology (Daniele Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein).

“The basic form of the game must be one in which we act.” Wittgenstein in Klagge Philosophical Occasions p397(1993)

A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatism from the effects of culture. All study of higher order thought (HOT) is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatism vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2.

S1 is the simple automated functions of our subcortical, involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of cortical, voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, S2 consists of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating)-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). UA is my term for what is usually called ‘theory of mind’ and I think it is a critical distinction as it keeps in front of us the fact that the basis for our interaction with other beings is an automatic part of S1 and not an empirically decidable or modifiable function of S2. This is

the basis for most of what is called “enactivism” or “embodiment” and it comes straight from W (though rarely acknowledged).

The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, since HOT cannot occur without involving much of the intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatizations", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP).

The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide array of universal cultural deontic relationships (S3) so well described by Searle. I think this fairly well abstracts the basic structure of behavior.

So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. is representational in the W/S sense of having public COS) and is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would translate the paragraphs from S's MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows.

In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP (“first self”) as modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved “second self”, are totally dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) the Causally Self Referential (CSR) rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI).

"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117

Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. One refers to the true-only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes (including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology which are Causally Self Referential (CSR)- (called reflexive or intransitive in W's BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing etc.) which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (‘I

know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB).

Note that COS, CSR, DOF, DIRA, Word to World etc. are all terms introduced or standardized by Searle but their division into COS1, COS2 etc. to accommodate the now dominant two systems framework is my own, which I regard as indispensable.

To get S's framework clear I have picked several quotes from his recent works.

"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193

"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32

And a last comment from W—one of his most penetrating and universally relevant to thinking about behavior.

"How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent).—And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them. W PI p308

Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. However since what S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and is in turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is able to become propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious activities of S1 must be able to become the conscious ones of S2. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W

would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. It would e.g., mean that truth and falsity and the facts of the world could be decided without consciousness. As W stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book "On Certainty", life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die--no evolution, no people, no philosophy.

Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generates the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is "right" but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1, which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S 'The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker 'The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides 'The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is not credible.

A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is, as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd-Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here that 'grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find—beyond even Searle.

Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well formed sentence expressing COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"..."Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know."

W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With an evolutionary perspective, W's later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky's famous comment: "Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology."

W recognized that 'Nothing is Hidden'—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of introspective access to our "inner life" (e.g., "The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459). Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal Sharrock (DMS) but afaik nobody else, points out).

Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the consequences of an S1 'mistake' are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false propositions.

In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even $\frac{3}{4}$ of a century in the case of some of W's teachings), I have never seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and with rare exceptions there is barely a mention.

The authors in this book are, like most philosophers and behavioral scientists, largely in the dark regarding subjects that I consider essential to a description of behavior—a good understanding of W and S, evolutionary psychology, automaticity of behavior and the two systems of thought. Nevertheless, they are generally thought provoking since they have as their theme the scintillating works of S. The title of the first article on p35 by Cheng shows a basic and just about universal misunderstanding as it proposes to present a Neo-Confucian view of S's philosophy. It should be obvious from the above that the basic philosophical issues are always about mistakes in language used to describe our *universal* innate psychology and there is no useful sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. Such views can exist in the broad cultural or non-universal sense of philosophy, but that is not what philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any interesting and substantive philosophy) is about. It would take the whole review just to start on a reply to it and S does an excellent job, so I will just comment that re p35 propositions are S2 and not mental states which are S1, as W made quite clear over $\frac{3}{4}$ of a century ago, and that both Quine and Davidson were equally confused about the basic issues involved (both Searle and Hacker have done xInt demolitions of Quine). As often, S's discussion is marred by his failure to carry his understanding of W's "background" to its logical conclusion (a failing of Hacker as well, as DMS has noted), and so he suggests (as he has frequently) that we might have to give up the concept of free will—a notion I find (with W) is incoherent as it is not something we can decide about. If some description of behavior is to have teeth, we should always be asking ourselves what actual impact it has on our life if we adopt it. If "choice" is a "meaningless" illusion, then there is really no COS at all, or does it have the same COS when our arm goes up when we want to scratch our ear as when it is pulled up by a string?

S himself has countless times used W's example of the difference between our arm going up because someone moves it, and going up because we make it do so. There is no further division of its going up to scratch our ear into voluntary and involuntary scratching. This is the bedrock or background--as W puts it, explanations and descriptions stop here. Philosophy, neuroscience and physics have nothing to add that changes the description in any way.

Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our axiomatic EP) as our being able to talk at all presupposes it (as W/S note frequently). "Reduction" along with "monism", "reality", etc., are complex contextual language games and they do not carry meaning along in little backpacks. One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how another usage (context) differs. The 20,000 pages of W's *nachlass* are hands down the best lesson on how this has to be done, but Cheng has no idea and so lapses into incoherence many times a page. He can of course take comfort in the fact that he has millions for company.

Fraser's article (as S notes) is generally excellent as he does a rare thing—he actually understands a lot of what S has written and gives a clear account of it. If only he had some grasp of all the other subjects I outlined above. Regarding his note 5 one needs to remember that dispositions (e.g., thinking, knowing) that state a COS are thereby true or false and a function of S2 (as opposed to S1 which are true only). And the "radical under-determination of meaning" was first solved by W who noted that S1 is true only.

In another recent volume S comments "The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our representations", to which I would add "Our life shows a world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged." We need to remind ourselves that the basic problem of philosophy is that, when the context is not clear—i.e., almost always when philosophizing-- you can *say* anything, but you cannot *mean* anything –i.e., only certain COS can apply in *this* context.

Fraser's discussion of intention p67-69 is good, but again in my view it is critical to be mindful of the difference between S1 (unconscious, involuntary, true only, nonlinguistic mental states) and S2 (conscious, voluntary, true or false, often linguistic and not mental states). A COS, or mental state or desire independent reason for action in S1 is utterly different from one in S2 and as I have often suggested (following W) one ought not to speak of them as S1 phenomena at all. As noted in my other reviews, if one insists to use such terms for both S1 and S2 then one should use COS1, COS2, DIRA1, DIRA2 etc. and keep firmly in mind that COS1 are "internal criteria" (i.e., not really criteria at all) while COS2 are external public criteria that can be true or false. See Fraser's notes 10 and 11. Fraser notes on p89 that insofar as wu-wei is the idea that life can become entirely automated it must be confused—this would mean S2 or our conscious voluntary life disappears and we join the bacteria. Regarding note 37 I would comment that "background" is W's concept long before it became S's and that muscle contraction, though carried out by S1 is often generated by S2—the only end result possible for our consciousness is contraction of muscles. S's response mentions "high level" and "low level" which we should interpret as S2 and S1.

Krueger's article is a generally good "enactivist" or "embodied" account but we should note that W was the first enactivist and that S is one as well as they both insist on the COS as the test of meaningful behavior, and on the S1, S2 framework (though they do not use these terms). He does however go overboard in suggesting wu-wei is superior to S's account and makes the usual error in suggesting that we "explain" behavior rather than just describing it and, like nearly everyone, has no clue that the best description of behavior and of the axiomatic functioning of S1 is that of W, especially in his last work "On Certainty". Again I suggest the recent book by Hutto and Myin for a rigorous account of the S1, S2 orientation in "Radicalizing Enactivism" (see my review). Krueger calls this the "internalism/externalism" debate. His misunderstandings are nicely summarized on p106 when he says the wu-wei refers to "inner states" and that its depiction of action without representation is at odds with S's account. But it is clearly not, as it depicts S1 and S perfectly well describes S1. At issue here is what S has nicely termed The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), which roughly means that S1 is not available to consciousness and so is not "real". On p122 he indicates that S implies intentionality is solely present in the brain but neither S nor W ever says this and constantly show that the basic concept of meaning is COS, which is a public act or occurrence. The confusion of his statement of embodiment or enactivism is epitomized in the last sentence of section 5 on p123 with "Intentionality is not a logical feature of mentality but rather a lived relation that is enacted through our embodied engagement with the world." The cure is to cross out "not" and change "but rather" to "and". S1 and S2 feed back into each other and combine the primitive automatic reflexive behaviors with the advanced conscious linguistic dispositions to produce actions

with public COS. S's response is a classic description of intentionality and TPI which should be memorized by all those interested in human behavior. One should read his article "The Phenomenological Illusion" and my reviews of his books and those by and about W, especially that of Johnston's "Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner." S condenses a huge cloud of philosophy into a few drops of grammar in the first paragraph on p126 when he notes that our intentionality (i.e., the S2 part of it) is representational because it can succeed or fail--i.e., be true or false—i.e., be propositional as it has external public COS whereas S1 does not.

Allinson makes most of the basic mistakes about how language works, as most people do when they philosophize, and so it is inevitable that he gets S wrong as well.

As noted, it would be of great interest to have S's response to Allinson, but it was not printed and nobody was able to help me get it. So there is only a short comment by S who thinks these are not Chinese but Western confusions, but it is clear they are universal ones.

The next few papers had some mildly interesting comments on Chinese philosophy and religion but nothing of any substance on S or philosophy in the narrow sense. Martinich is a well known author on language but sadly he has hardly a clue about what S or W have done. Regarding Willman there is again nothing about the basic framework for describing behavior and unconscious true only S1 gets mixed with conscious dispositional S2 with the usual disastrous results (see middle of p265), and again S is way too kind.

Nuyen's paper brings up the fact that few people understand that in most contexts, if behavior varies from one person to another that means it's cultural and not innate. Every normal person enjoys eating but its culture that makes some like raw earthworms. Regarding S's response the quickest and clearest way I know to understand desire independent reasons for action (and how to separate DIRA1 from DIRA2) is to read my reviews of S.

Chong's paper is mostly about philosophy in the broad sense and I would only comment that pretty much all previous notions of morality, ethics and rights seem obsolete. As we head for total collapse of what passes for civilization we need to have a long term global ecological basis for these as is commonly noted. One of my favorites in this regard is the Wittgensteinian philosopher Rupert Read, who has e.g., used this perspective to deconstruct the work of Rawls (e.g., "A Theory of Justice").

The article by Fraser and Wong shows some grasp of S but (as is almost universal) it is truly amazing to see people try to describe (not explain as that takes us in a whole different direction—i.e., to a dead end) behavior with little understanding of S1, S2, dispositions, evolutionary psychology, automatism, twin studies etc. Only p316-17 were of interest to me and I have already commented on this.

Stroll is a senior scholar and W expert but I see problems in both his remarks and S's on the subject of our certain knowledge. The comments on p345 fail to note the complex and highly varied language games subsumed by "knowledge", "certainty", "evidence", "true", "proof" etc. We can speak of "evidence" of water when we see what looks like a pond in the distance but not when we are standing next to it watching the ducks swim around. Only

philosophers would use it the latter way and it's not an intelligible use. Hands down the best treatment I know of how falsifiable statements become true only and of the axiomatic basis of knowledge is W's "On Certainty".

Lum's paper is pretty good, as we would expect from a former student of S's, but there is some unclarity. Perhaps we see the origin of this in S's reply p377, where he fails to demarcate S1 and S2 and so COS1, COS2 and says unconscious states(i.e., S1) can function in virtue of their propositional contents, which needs very careful elaboration describing how S1 generates and merges into S2 (as W did so well in "On Certainty").

Zheng is mostly excellent with the paragraph in the middle of p386 being fine, once translated into the S1, S2 dispositional language, and most of p392-3 on the background or network or bedrock (i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology) being as good a summary description of high level behavior as I have seen.

I have no new comments on the final contribution by Mou, but S felt it showed TPI which is a contagious disease in modern philosophy, as it must be since it is another manifestation of what W often referred to as the lack of perspicuity of language.

This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest philosophers of recent times, and in my view the best since Wittgenstein. There is much value in analyzing his responses to the many basic confusions manifested here and in the generally excellent attempts to connect classical Chinese thought to modern philosophy. It is a great pity that it remains a rare expensive volume that nobody reads.