Policies for Constraining the Behaviour of Coalitions of Agents in the Context of Algebraic Information Theory

Authors: Christopher Goddard

This article takes an oblique sidestep from two previous papers, wherein an approach to reformulation of game theory in terms of information theory, topology, as well as a few other notions was indicated. In this document a description is provided as to how one might determine an approach for an agent to choose a policy concerning which actions to take in a game that constrains behaviour of subsidiary agents. It is then demonstrated how these results in algebraic information theory, together with previous investigations in geometric and topological information theory, can be unified into a single cohesive framework.

Comments: 27 Pages.

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[v1] 2019-11-28 13:22:22

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