Set Theory and Logic


Refutation of Peirce's Abduction and Induction, and Confirmation of Deduction

Authors: Colin James III

We evaluate definitions of C.S. Peirce for abduction, induction and deduction: all are inversions of the same sentence. However, when the connectives are changed to implication, abduction and induction are not tautologous, leaving deduction as the only form of tautologous inference in logic.

Comments: 2 Pages.

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Submission history

[v1] 2019-02-16 20:49:36
[v2] 2019-02-18 20:11:18

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