Social Science

   

Transforming Candidate and Parties Cardinal Ratings Into Weak Preference Orderings

Authors: Ricardo Alvira

An easy procedure is explained for converting usually accesible statistical information on voters preferences, into an aggregated citizenship preference profile. Two regional elections recently held in Spain are modelled, and results are reviewed in terms of voting paradoxes and statistical correlation with collective preference.

Comments: 107 Pages. Communication at XV Meeting Spanish Social Choice Network, REES

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Submission history

[v1] 2019-01-26 11:01:14
[v2] 2019-01-27 05:43:51

Unique-IP document downloads: 23 times

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