Set Theory and Logic


Refutation of the Second Incompleteness Theorem by Gödel Logic

Authors: Colin James III

Gödel's second incompleteness theorem as based on the minimal modal logic to express the Löb axiom is not tautologous. Subsequent substitutions into the Löb axiom along with Hájek's earlier lemma raise further suspicion about Gödel-justification logic.

Comments: 3 Pages. © Copyright 2018 by Colin James III All rights reserved. Respond to the author by email at: info@ersatz-systems dot com.

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Submission history

[v1] 2018-10-19 12:19:11

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