Authors: Georges Sarafopoulos
In this paper we point to the difficulty of applying concepts of microeconomic theory (competition between products and firms) at the political level (competition between regions). To emphasize this difficulty we present a model of competition between two local governments in order to show complexity and non-predictability. We consider the interaction between local governments during the implementation of a reform on regional development through a discrete – time duopoly game where the players have homogeneous expectations. The existence and stability of equilibria of this system are studied. We show that a parameter of the system may change the stability of equilibrium and cause a structure to behave chaotically. For the low values of this parameter the game has a stable Nash equilibrium. Increasing these values, the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable, through period-doubling bifurcation. The complex dynamics, bifurcations and chaos are displayed by computing numerically Lyapunov numbers and sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
Comments: 11 Pages. Published in The Hellenic Open Business Administration Journal; https://hobajournal.wordpress.com/
[v1] 2018-07-01 04:13:28
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