Recently, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf] proposed a new scheme to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. We proved in a former paper [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.4664] that GAA’s mathematical model is unphysical. Here we analyze GAA’s cracking scheme and show that in the cable loss free case it serves less eavesdropping information than the old mean-square based attack, while in the loss-dominated case it offers no information. We also investigate GAA's experimental claim to be capable of distinguishing, with a poor statistics over a few correlation times, the distributions of two Gaussian noises with a relative variance difference of less than 10–8. Normally such distinctions would require hundreds of millions of correlations times to be observable. We identify several experimental artifacts due to poor design that can lead to GAA’s assertions; deterministic currents due to spurious harmonic components ground loop, DC offset; aliasing; non-Gaussian features including non-linearities and other non-idealities in the generators; and the time-derivative nature of their scheme enhancing all these aspects.
Comments: 11 Pages. missing/incorrect abstract fixed; extended (second) version
Unique-IP document downloads: 110 times
Add your own feedback and questions here:
You are equally welcome to be positive or negative about any paper but please be polite. If you are being critical you must mention at least one specific error, otherwise your comment will be deleted as unhelpful.